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Abstract
This paper responds to claims that causal closure of the underlying microphysics
determines brain outcomes as a matter of principle, even if we cannot hope to ever
carry out the needed calculations in practice. Following two papers of mine where
I claim firstly that downward causation enables genuine causal powers to occur at
higher emergent levels in biology (and hence in the brain) [Ellis 2020a], and that
secondly causal closure is in reality an interlevel affair involving even social levels
[Ellis 2020b], Carlo Rovelli has engaged with me in a dialogue where he forcefully
restates the reductionist position that microphysics alone determines all, specifically
the functioning of the brain. Here I respond to that claim in depth, claiming that if one
firstly takes into account the difference between synchronic and diachronic emergence,
and secondly takes seriously the well established nature of biology in general and
neuroscience in particular, my position is indeed correct.
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1 Physics, The Brain, and Predictability
After I published articles in Foundation of Physics on emergence in solid state physics and
biology [Ellis 2020a] and on causal closure in biology and engineering contexts [Ellis 2020b],
I have had an interesting exchange with Carlo Rovelli questioning my arguments. This
paper responds as regards brain function. In Section 1.1 I will give an edited version of
that interchange. In section 1.2 I outline my response. The key point is that while his
argument does indeed apply in the case of synchronic emergence - emergence at one point
in time - it does not apply in the case of diachronic emergence, that is, emergence as it
unfolds over time. The paper is summarised in Section 1.3.
1.1 A dialogue
Here is a summary of that dialogue.
CR - You list a large number of situations in which we understand phenomena, cause and
effects, and we make sense of reality, using high level concepts. I think this is great.
- You point out that nobody is able to account for these phenomena in terms of
microphysics. I think this is true.
- You emphasize the fact that we *need* these high level notions to understand the
world. I think this is important and is an observation which is underappreciated by
many. I agree.
- You point out that to some extent similar points have been made by a number of
biologists, solid state physicists, etcetera. I definitely think this is true.
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⇒ Then, you jump to a conclusion about microphysics, which does not follow from
any of the above. And I think that the large majority of physicists also think that
it does not follow. Given a phenomenon (condensed matter, biology, anything else),
happening in a specific situation in a specific context, it is the belief of the near
majority of physicists today that the initial microphysical data (which we may not
know), determines uniquely the probability distribution of the later outcomes.
How does this square with all your examples, and why there is no contradiction
between all your examples and the points you make, and this? The reason is that
in all your examples the high-level cause is also a microphysics configuration. For
instance, a crystal configuration determines the motion of the electrons, smoking
causes cancer, my getting excited changes the motion of the electrons in my body.
All this is true of course. But a crystal configuration, smoking, my getting excited
are also microphysical states of affairs. Once we fold them in the microphysics, there
is no reason whatsoever for the microphysics not to be sufficient to determine what
happens. There isn’t something “in addition” to the microphysics. It is only that
the microphysics is far more complicated than what we can manage directly in our
calculations of simple minded understanding.
Where is our disagreement? It is not big. But I think it is crucial, and I think
it can be summarized in the case of the effect of Jupiter and the drop of water
on the beach of Marseille affected by its gravitational pull. Here we can take the
microphysics to be the Newtonian gravitation of all the small grains of matter in
the Solar system, governed by classical mechanics with Newtonian interactions and
short scale pressure. This is a good level of approximation. Can we compute the
motion of the drop of water using the Newton equations and all the forces? Of course
we cannot. There are far too many grains of matter in the Solar system. But we
can go to a higher level description, where we ignore a huge amount of details and
we represent everything in terms of a few planets in their orbits. ”Planet” is not a
notion in the microphysics. It is a simple calculation to account for the tidal forces
due to the Moon and the Sun and to estimate the small correction due to Jupiter.
And we find that the drop of water last Tuesday came a bit higher than expected
because of Jupiter.
Here is the point: there is nothing I see, in all the examples you mention that
distinguishes them from this version of“top-down-causation”: The high-level effect of
Jupiter affects the motion of a drop of water. I do not see any difference between this
and the crystalline structure affecting motion of electrons in condensed matter, or a
biological molecule reacting to an evolutionary pressure, or my excitement affecting
the motion of an electron.
GE You are then agreeing that high level causation is real?
CR ”Causal” mean all sort of different things for all sort of different people. I am not
being pedantic, I think it is one of the cruxes of the matter. Instinctively, I am with
Russell that notices that there are no ”causes” in physics: there are just regularities
expressed by laws. But of course I am aware (with Cartwright ) that we do use
causes heavily and effectively . I think that ”causes” make sense with respect to
an agent that can act, and that the agency of the agent is ultimately rooted in
entropy growth. If ”causal” concepts are understood in this high level and sort of
non-fundamental manner, then suddenly your entire project makes sense to me I
do not think that anybody would deny that smoking causes cancer. Therefore, yes,
I agree that high level causation is real. I think that ”smoking” denotes a large
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ensemble of microphysical configurations, all of which (actually, in this context:
many of which), evolving according to microphysical laws without any reference to
higher order notions, evolve into later microphysical configurations that belong to
the ensemble that we call ”a person with cancer”.
GE “The reason is that in all your examples the high-level cause is also a microphysics
configuration” Yes indeed This sounds very close to Denis Noble’s Principle of Bio-
logical relativity, extended to include the physics level, which is what I propose in
my two papers [Ellis 2020a] [Ellis 2020b]. I certainly state that the micro levels are
effective, as you do - there is no disagreement there. Maybe then we are not so far
apart. Question: would you agree that you can invert that statement to get: ”in all
these examples the microphysics configuration is also a high-level cause”?
CR Here we are back to the ambiguity of the notion of “cause”. I do not know what you
mean. The microphysical configurations belonging to “smoking” do evolve into those
belonging to “cancer”, while the microphysical configurations “almost everything the
same but not smoking”, do not. If this is what we mean by “cause”, I agree. If there
is some other meaning of “cause”, I sincerely do not understand it. I think that this
is what we more more less mean usually, (what else means “smoking causes cancer”
if not that by not not smoking we can get less cancer?), then I am happy to use
“cause” here.
GE This is the key phrase: ”Once we fold them in the microphysics”. This sounds very
much like what I am saying. The higher level situation is setting the context for the
microphysics to act, and hence shaping the specific outcomes that occur through the
microphysics If that is what you mean, then we agree! Otherwise what does that
phrase mean?
CR No, here we disagree, I think. Because there isn’t the microphysics, and then some-
thing else that sets the context. The macro-physics is just a way of talking about
microphysical states. ”Smoking” is not something that that is added to the micro-
physics: it is that one possible configuration of the microphysics. More precisely:
an ensemble of many possible configurations of the microphysics. This is the main
point: you cannot have the same microphysics with different ”contexts”. Different
”contexts” always require different microphysics. It is the key question: the question
I asked you when we started talking about that at a conference somewhere: suppose
there are two Chess games on two different planets: everything looks the same but
the rules of Chess are a bit different on the two planets (in one you can castle after
having moved the king, in the other you cannot). Here a very high order difference
(different rules of Chess) make the evolution different in the two planets. BUT (here
is the point): could the rules in the two planets be exactly the same if the micro-
physics was the same? NO, of course, because different rules of the games means
different memories stored in the players brains, hence different synapses, hence dif-
ferent physics. To get a difference, you need different microphysical configurations.
You cannot have a high level source of difference without having a microphysics level
difference that achieves the same result.
GE To get full clarity, please clarify two questions:
1. Consider one person and the issue of smoking; or (for your neuroscientist friends)
one person’s brain states when they play chess. Are you envisaging the total cause of
their future behaviour being the microphysics configuration of their own body/brain,
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or of some larger ensemble of particles? If so, what set? What set does “causal
closure””, in your terms, refer to?
CR A larger ensemble of course, because what happens to a person depends on plenty of
exterior influences.
GE The second question.
2. Do you consider “folding them in the microphysics” (first reply above) as an
ongoing process that is taking place all the time, or not?
CR “Folding then in the microphysics” means recognizing what they are, once translated
into microphysics. They are ensembles of microphysical states. If you do this at
the start of a time interval and if you include enough degrees of freedom to account
for anything that matters, then the microscopic evolution does the job, whether or
not we can compute. If this was NOT the case, we would have found cases whether
these evolution laws fail. When people say that a theory is ”causally closed” they
mean that the initial conditions determine the following (of course: in principle. In
practice we cannot do the calculations, nor know all relevant initial conditions.)
GE To be clear, is it a process that takes place once at the start of some interaction (the
brain starts considering a chess problem) and then the physics by itself determines
all outcomes; or is it an ongoing process that is taking place all the time ?
CR It is not a process. I can in principle describe the set of events without any reference
to high level concepts, or I can describe the set of events using high level concepts.
Both work. The difference is that one may be unmanageable and the other may be
manageable. We have these different levels of description everywhere in life: I can
think of my trip from Verona to Marseille accounting for the instantaneous changes
of velocities, or I can represent it just as average constant velocity with some snack-
pauses. The first is unmanageable, the second uses high level concepts, is more
useful. But it has less information than the first, not more.
GE Finally, of course I believe the outcomes lies in the space of possibilities allowed by
the microphysics. It could not be otherwise, and the marvel is that that set of
laws is able to produce such complexity. There is no way I am underestimating
what the physics allows. In the case of biology, I see it as happening because the
physics allows the existence of the Platonic space of all possible proteins discussed
by Andreas Wagner in his marvelous book Arrival of the Fittest [Wagner 2014].
CR Yes, this is what I meant. I am glad we agree here. This space of possibility is
immense, and too hard to explore theoretically even if we know the microscopic laws
and the fact these laws are not violated and they determine (probabilistic) evolution
unequivocally. Still, we carve it out for our understanding by recognising high level
patterns and using them. But then why do you need the microphysics to be affected
by something outside it? You do not need it. And we have zero evidence for anything
like this. The autonomy of the higher level logic that you keep citing is no argument
against the autonomy of the microphysics.
But you seem to mean more. Do you mean that they select which dynamical histories
are realised and which not? That is: which initial conditions are allowed and which
not? Or they select which quantum outcomes become actual, over and above the
quantum probability amplitudes? Or what else?
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It seems to me you confuse the richness of the tools of a physicist, and the complexity
of reality, with a statement about lack of causal closure of the microphysics, that
does not follow.
Finally, a last response:
CR Today the burden of the proof is not on this side. Is on the opposite side. Because:
(i) There is no single phenomenon in the world where microphysics has been proven
wrong (in its domain of validity of velocity, energy, size...).
(ii) By induction and Occam razor, is a good assumption that in its domain validity
it holds.
(iii) There are phenomena too complex to calculate explicitly with microphysics.
These provide no evidence against (ii), they only testify to our limited tools.
There is much more, but I will not repeat it all. Rather I summarise points of agreement,
of misunderstanding, and of disagreement, and then take up that challenge.
Points of agreement
• All is based in immutable lower level physical laws, unaffected by context
• These laws allow immensely complex outcomes when applied to very complex mi-
crostates, such as those that underlie a human brain
• Testable higher level laws correctly express dynamics at higher levels
• They make processes at that level transparent in a way that is completely hidden
when one traces that same dynamics at the lower levels
Point of misunderstanding
• Downward causation
[CR] From your examples it does not follow that our current elementary theories,
such GR and the SM, have free parameters that are controlled by something else
that we understand. That would be a wild speculation unsupported by anything.
[GE] The theories themselves of course do not have such parameters, and I have
never claimed that they do. But Lagrangians used in specific contexts do.
Those theories per se have generic Lagrangians that apply to anything at all, and so
say nothing detailed about anything specific. They do not by themselves determine
outcomes in biology or engineering. A particular context determines the details of
the terms in the Lagrangian, and that happens in a contextually dependent way:
after all, in a particular case it represents a specific context. Once the Lagrangian
has been determined at time t1 then the next emergent step is indeed fully deter-
mined purely at the micro physical level, as Carlo claims. But macro conditions
can then change parameters in the Lagrangian. That is where the downward causal
effects come in. For specific examples, the case of transistors in digital computers is
discussed in [Ellis and Drossel 2019], and voltage gated ion channels in the brain in
[Ellis and Kopel 2019].
The key issue is whether downward causation is real, having real causal powers. I
argue that it is; and that this kind of causation does not required any compromising
of the underlying physics. It works by changing constraints [Juarrero 2002].
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Points of disagreement
CR (i) In principle, we could entirely deduce what happens even ignoring the high-level
concepts
(ii) In practice, we use high-level concepts
(iii) In addition, we get a better grasp, a better sense of ”understanding”, a better
control, in terms of higher level notions.
Hence: high-level notions are far more relevant for comprehension of the world. I
think that (ii) and (iii) are very important.
(iv) But if you add the negation of (i), you get everybody disagreeing (me included)
and the message about (ii) and (iii) does not go through.
GE 1 Causation in biology is an interlevel concept [Mossio 2013]. Physics underlies this
but does not by itself give causal closure. What Carlo calls “causal closure of physics”
is in fact the statement that at its own level, it is a well-posed theory: a completely
different affair.
2 Carlo’s statement can be defended in the synchronic case (at a time), but is not
always true for individual brains in the diachronic case (unfolding over time).
3 Statistics don’t cut it. Individual events occur. We have to explain why specific
individual brain events occur, for example leading to the specific words in Carlo’s
emails. Specific events in individual lives occur and need to be accounted for.
4 Microphysics enables this but does not determine the outcomes. The basic physics
interactions of course enable all this to happen: they allow incredible complexity to
emerge. Higher level organising principles such as Darwin’s theory of evolution then
come into play. That then changes the macro level context and hence the micro level
context. This downward process [Campbell 1974] relies on concepts such as ‘living’
that simply cannot be represented at the microlevel, but determine outcomes.
5 The reductionist physics view is based in a linear view of causation. Central to the
way biology works are the closely related ideas of self cause and circular causation.
1.2 A response
In the rest of this paper, I give a full response to Carlo’s arguments in the case of the
brain, based in the nature of causation in biology. It rests on three things. First, tak-
ing seriously the nature of biology in general [Campbell and Reece 2008] and neuroscience
[Kandel 2012] [Kandel et al 2013] in particular, demanding that whatever overall theory
we propose must respect that nature. Second, requiring that individual events and out-
comes are what need to be accounted for, not just statistics. Third, noting the key
difference between synchronic and diachronic emergence, which we did not make in our
email interchange. The answer is very different in these two cases.
Synchronic and diachronic emergence Carlo’s argument - the microstate uniquely
determines macro level outcomes - is correct when we consider synchronic emergence.
That is what a lot of neuroscience is about. It is not valid however when one considers
diachronic emergence. The issue here is one of timescales.
Synchronic emergence is when the timescale δt := tb − ta of the considered micrody-
namic outcomes is very short relative to the timescale δT of change of structures at the
micro scale: δT ≫ δt. It is the issue of emergent dynamics when parameters are constant
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and constraints unchanging. In the case of the brain this would for example be the flow
of electrons in axons leading to mental outcomes at that time, with this micro structure
taken as unchanging. Electrons and ions flow in a given set of neural connections.
Diachronic emergence is when the timescale of micro dynamic outcomes considered δt
is of the same order or larger than the timescale δT of change of structure at the micro
scale: δT ≤ δt, so microdynamics contexts alters significantly during this time. It is the
case when parameters or constraints change because of interactions that are taking place.
In the case of the brain this would for example be when something new is learned so that
strengths of neural connections are altered.
Consider first a single brain Dynamic outcomes at the molecular scale are due to the
specific structures at the cellular scale, neural connectivity for example, and the way that
they in turn constrain electron and ion activity. Three points arise.
• First, the brain is an open system . It is not possible for the initial physical state
to determine later states because of the flood of data incoming all the time. The
last round of microlevel data does not determine the initial data that applies at the
next round of synchronic emergence. The brain has evolved a set of mechanisms that
enable it to cope with the stream of new data flowing in all the time by perceiving its
meaning, predicting futures, and planning how to respond. This is what determines
outcomes rather than evolution from the last round of initial data.
• Second, the brain is a plastic brain that changes over time as it learns. Neural
connections are altered as learning takes place in response to the incoming stream
of data. This change in constraints alters future patterns of electron and ion flows.
This learning involves higher level variables and understandings such as “A global
Coronavirus pandemic is taking place”, that cannot be characterised at lower levels
and cannot be predicted from the initial brain microdata.
• Third, there is a great deal of stochasticity at the molecular level that breaks
the ideal of Laplacian determinism at that level. Molecular machines have been
evolved that take advantage of that stochasticity to extract order from chaos. From
a higher level perspective, this stochasticity enables organisms to select lower level
outcomes that are advantageous to higher level needs. From a systems perspective,
this enables higher level organising principles such as existence of dynamical system
basins of attraction to determine outcomes.
This argument applies to all biology, as all biological systems are by their nature open
systems [Peacocke 1989]. The initial physics data for any organism by itself cannot in
principle determine specific later outcomes because of this openness.
The fundamental physical laws are not altered or overwritten when this happens; rather
the context in which they operate - for example opening or closing of ion channels in
axons - determine what the specific outcomes of generic physical laws will be as alter
configuration. From a physics viewpoint this is represented by time dependent constraint
terms or potentials in the underlying Hamiltonian [Ellis and Kopel 2019].
The whole universe gambit The ultimate physicalist response is “Yes the brain may
be an open system but the whole universe is not; and the brain is just part of the universe,
which is causally complete. Hence brain dynamics is controlled by the microphysics alone
when one takes this into account, because it determines all the incoming information to
the brain”. However this argument fails for the following reasons:
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• Firstly there is irreducible quantum uncertainty in outcomes, which implies
the lower physics levels are in fact not causally complete. This can get amplified
to macroscales by mechanisms that change mental outcomes, such as altered gene
expression due to damage by high energy photons.
• Secondly, this downward process - inflow of outside information to individual brains
- does not uniquely determine brain how microstructures change through memory
processes because of multiple realisability . But such uniqueness is required to
sustain a claim that the causal closedness of microphysics determines specific brain
outcomes over time.
• Thirdly, chaotic dynamics associated with strange attractors occurs, which means
the emergent dynamics of weather patterns is not in fact predictable even in principle
over sufficiently long timescales. This affects decisions such as whether to take an
umbrella when going to the shops or not.
• Fourthly, microbiome dynamics in the external world affects brain outcomes in
unpredictable ways, for example when a global pandemic occurs
• Fifthly, this all takes place in a social context where social interactions take place
between many brains, each of which is itself an open system. Irreducible uncertainty
influences such contexts due to the real butterfly effect (weather) and the impossi-
bility, due to the molecular storm, of predicting specific microbiome mutations that
occur (e.g. COVID-19), leading to social policy decisions, that are high level vari-
ables influencing macro level brain states. The outcomes then influence details of
synaptic connections and hence shape future electron and ion flows.
This downward causation from the social/psychological level to action potential spike
chains and synapse activation is essential to the specific outcomes that occur at the physical
level of electron and ion flows in individual brains. Causal closure only follows when we
include those higher level variables in the dynamics.
1.3 The argument that follows
Section 2 sets the scene by discussing the foundations for what follows, in particular the
fact that life is an ongoing adaptive process. In the following sections I discuss the key
issues that support my view.
Firstly, an individual brain is an open system, and has been adapted to handle the
problems this represents in successfully navigating the world (Section 3). This rather than
the initial brain micro data determines outcomes.
Secondly, the brain learns: it is plastic at both macro and micro levels, which contin-
ually changes the context within which the lower level physics operates (Section 4).
Third, the kind of Laplacian view of determinism underlying Carlo’s position is broken
at the molecular level because of the huge degree of stochasticity that happens at that level
(Section 5). Biological processes - such as Darwinian evolution, action choices, and the
brain pursuing a line of logical argumentation - are what in fact determine outcomes, taking
advantage of that stochasticity. Biological causation occurs selects preferred outcomes
from the molecular storm, and the brain selects from action options.
In section 6 I counter the whole universe gambit by claiming that this will not work
because of quantum wave function collapse, macro level chaotic dynamics, multiple realis-
ability of macro brain states, and unpredictable microbiome interactions that affect brain
dynamics both directly and via their social outcomes.
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Section 7 consider how higher level organising principles - the effective laws that operate
at higher levels - are in fact what shapes outcomes. This is what enables causal closure -
an interlevel affair - in practice. I also comment on the issue of freewill (Section 7.2).
2 Foundations
As stated above, the premise of this paper is that when relating physics to life, one should
take seriously the nature of biology as well as that of physics. I assume the standard un-
derlying microphysics for everyday life, based in the Lagrangian for electrons, protons, and
nuclei, see [Laughlin and Pines 2000] and [Bishop 2005]. This section sets the foundation
for what follows by discussing the nature of biology and of causation.
Section 2.1 discusses the basic nature of biology. Section 2.2 outlines the biological
hierarchy of structure and function. Section 2.3 discusses the nature of Effective Theories
at each emergent level L. Section 2.4 discusses the equal validity of each level in causal
terms. Section 2.5 discusses the various types of downward causation, and Aristotle’s four
types of causes as well as Tinbergen’s ‘Why’ questions. Section 2.6 discusses the important
issue of multiple realisability of higher level structure and function at lower levels. Finally
Section 2.7 discusses the key role of Higher Level Organising Principles.
2.1 The basic nature of biology
All life [Campbell and Reece 2008] is based in the interplay between structure (that is,
physiology [Hall 2016] [Rhoades and Pflanzer 1989]) and function. For good functional,
developmental, and evolutionary reasons, it is composed (Table 1:§2.2) of Adaptive
Modular Hierarchical Structures [Simon 2019] [Booch 2006] based in the underlying
physics. It comes into being via the interaction between evolutionary and developmental
(Evo-Devo) processes [Carroll 2005] [Carroll 2008], and has three key aspects. 1
1. Teleonomy: function/purpose Life has a teleonomic nature, where Jacques Monod
defines teleonomy as the characteristic of being ”endowed with a purpose or project”
([Monod 1971]:9) He points out the extreme efficiency of the teleonomic apparatus in ac-
complishing the preservation and reproduction of the structure. As summarised by Nobel
Prizewinner Leland Hartwell and colleagues [Hartwell et al 1999],
“Although living systems obey the laws of physics and chemistry, the notion
of function or purpose differentiates biology from other natural sciences. Or-
ganisms exist to reproduce, whereas, outside religious belief, rocks and stars
have no purpose. Selection for function has produced the living cell, with a
unique set of properties that distinguish it from inanimate systems of interact-
ing molecules. Cells exist far from thermal equilibrium by harvesting energy
from their environment. They are composed of thousands of different types of
molecule. They contain information for their survival and reproduction, in the
form of their DNA”.
Function and purpose emerge at the cell level. Francois Jacob says [Jacob 1974]2
“At each level of organisation novelties appear in both properties and logic. To
reproduce is not within the power of any single molecule by itself. This faculty
1An excellent introduction to the relevant mechanisms is given in [Noble 2016].
2Quoted in [Peacocke 1989]:275.
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appears only within the power of the simplest integron3 deserving to be called a
living organism, that is, the cell. But thereafter the rules of the game change.
At the higher level integron, the cell population, natural selection imposes new
constraints and offers new possibilities. In this way, and without ceasing to obey
the principles that govern inanimate systems, living systems become subject to
phenomena that have no meaning at the lower level. Biology can neither be
reduced to physics, nor do without it.”
2. Life is a process Being alive is not a physical thing made of any specific elements.
It is a process that occurs at macro levels, in an interconnected way. In the case of human
beings it involves all levels4 from L4 (the cellular level) to Level L6 (individual human
beings), allowing causal closure [Mossio 2013] [Mossio and Moreno 2010] and hence self-
causation [Juarrero 2002] [Murphy and Brown 2007].
Life is an ongoing adaptive process involving metabolism, homeosta-
sis, defence, and learning in the short term, reproduction, growth,
and development in the medium term, and evolution in the long
term. It uses energy, disposes of waste heat and products, and uses
contextual information to attain its purposes.
The claim I make is that this process of living has causal power, making things happen
in an ongoing way. High level processes take place via an interlevel dialogue between
levels [Noble 2008], higher levels continually altering the context of the underlying phys-
ical levels in order to carry out these functions [Ellis and Kopel 2019]. Yes of course
the resulting physical processes can be traced out at the physics level. But my claim
will be that biological imperatives [Campbell and Reece 2008] enabled by physiological
systems [Rhoades and Pflanzer 1989] [Hall 2016] shape what happens. Evolutionary pro-
cesses [Mayr 2001] [Carroll 2008] have enabled this synergy to occur [Noble 2016].
3. Basic biological needs and functions In the case of animal life,5 the basic bio-
logical functions are,
B1: Metabolism (acquiring energy and matter, getting rid of waste),
B2: Homeostasis and defence,
B3: Reproduction and subsequent development,
B4: Mobility and the ability to act,
B5: Information acquisition and processing.
They serve as attractors when variation takes places ([Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019]:245).
They are the higher level organising principles that evolution discovers and then embodies
in hierarchically structured physiological systems, where the macro functions are supported
at the micro level by metabolic networks, gene regulatory networks, and cell signalling net-
works, selected from an abstract space of possibilities and realised through specific proteins
[Wagner 2014]. Information is central to what happens [Nurse 2008] [Davies 2019].
These principles cannot be described or identified at the underlying microphysical levels
not just because the relevant variables are not available at that level, but because their
multiple realisability at lower levels means they do not correspond to specific patterns of
interactions at the ion and electron level. They correspond to a whole equivalence class of
such patterns of interactions (Section 2.6).
3An ‘Integron’ is each of the units in a hierarchy of discontinuous units formed by integration of
sub-units of the level below [Jacob 1974]:302.
4See Table 1, Section 2.2.
5Other forms of life share B1-3.
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4. Interaction networks These processes are realised by means of immensely complex
interaction networks at the molecular level [Buchanan et al 2010] [Junker & Schreiber 2011]:
N1: Metabolic Networks ([Wagner 2014] §3) [Noble 2016]
N2: Gene Regulatory Networks ([Wagner 2014] §5)
N3: Signalling Networks [Junker & Schreiber 2011] [Buchanan et al 2010]
N4: Protein Interaction Networks [Junker & Schreiber 2011]
based in very complex molecular interactions [Berridge 2014] and with higher level design
principles shaping their structure [Alon 2006], and at the cellular level,
N5: Neural Networks [Kandel et al 2013] [Churchland and Sejnowski 2016]
These networks compute in the sense of ([Churchland and Sejnowski 2016]:69-74)
5. Branching causal logic In order to meet these needs, the dynamics followed at
each level of biological hierarchies is based on contextually informed dynamical branch-
ing L that support the functions α of a trait T in a specific environmental context E
[Ellis and Kopel 2019]. Thus biological dynamics can be functionally-directed rather than
driven by inevitability or chance:
Biological dynamics tends to further the function α of a trait T
through contextually informed branching dynamics L (1)
where the dynamics L in its simplest form is branching logic of the form [Hoffmann 2012]
L: given context C, IF T (X) THENF1(Y), ELSE F2(Z) (2)
(a default unstated “ELSE” is always to leave the status quo). Here X is a contextual
variable which can have many dimensions, Y and Z are variables that may be the same
variables asX or not. T (X) is the truth value of arbitrary evaluative statements depending
on X. It can be any combination of Boolean logical operations (NOT, AND, OR, NOR,
etc.) and mathematical operations, while F1(Y) and F2(Z) are outcomes tending to
further the function α. Thus they might be the homeostatic response “If blood sugar
levels are too high, release insulin”, or the conscious dynamic “If the weather forecast
says it will rain, take an umbrella”. At the molecular level, these operations are based in
the lock and key molecular recognition mechanism ([Noble 2016]:71), [Berridge 2014]. This
mechanism is how information [Nurse 2008] [Davies 2019] gets to shape physical outcomes.
6. Brain Function The human brain supports all these activities by a series of higher
level processes and functions. These are [Purves et al 2008] [Gray and Bjorklund 2018]
BR1: Sensation, perception, classification
BR2: Prediction, planning, making decisions, and action
BR3: Experimenting, learning, and remembering
BR4: Experiencing and responding to emotions
BR5: Interacting socially, communicating by symbols and language
BR6: Metacognition, analysis, and reflection, ‘off-line’ exploration of possibilities.
It does so via its complex adaptive modular hierarchical structure [Kandel et al 2013]
[Scott 2002]. Brains compute [Marr 2010] [Churchland and Sejnowski 2016], but they are
not digital computers [Piccinini and Shagrir 2014].
2.2 The hierarchy
The framework for the following is the hierarchy of structure and function for the biological
sciences shown in (Table 1), based in the underlying physics.
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Biology Levels Processes
Level 8 (L8) Environment Ecological, environmental processes
Level 7 (L7) Society Social processes
Level 6 (L6) Individuals Psychological processes, actions
Level 5 (L5) Physiological systems Homeostasis, emergent functions
Level 4 (L4) Cells Basic processes of life
Level 3 (L3) Biomolecules Gene regulation, metabolism
Level 2 (L2) Atom, ion, electron Physics Atomic, ionic, electron interactions
Level 1 (L1) Particle and Nuclear Physics Quark, lepton interactions
Table 1: The hierarchy of structure for biology (left) and corresponding processes (right).
L2 is the relevant physics level of emergence, L4 the fundamental biological level, made
possible by L3 (in particular proteins, RNA, DNA), in turn made possible by L2 and so L1.
The first level where the processes of life occur is L4, the level of cells. At level L6 one
finds the integrated processes of an individual organism. At level L7 one finds sociology,
economics, politics, and legal systems.
2.3 Effective theories
I am assuming that each of these levels exists as a matter of fact - they exist ontologically.
The key issue is, if we propose a specific level L exists ontologically, there should be a valid
Effective Theory ETL applicable at that level which characterizes that level. ‘Valid’ means
it either makes testable predictions that have been confirmed, or at least characterizes the
variables that would enter such a relation.6 Here following [Ellis 2020a] and [Ellis 2020b],
one can characterise an Effective Theory ETL(aL) valid at some level L as follows:
An Effective Theory ETL(aL) at an emergent level L is a reliable relation
between initial conditions described by effective variables vL ∈ L and outcomes
oL ∈ L:
ETL(aL) : vL ∈ L→ ETL(aL)[vL] = oL ∈ L (3)
where aL are parameters of the relation, and ETL(aL) may be an exact or
statistical law. The parameters aL may be vectorial or tensorial
Thus I will define a meaningful level to exist if there is such a relation. Determining that
relation is in effect epistemology, but what it indicates is the underlying ontology.
The effective theory ETL(aL) is well posed if for specific choices of the parameters
aL it provides a unique mapping (3) from vL to oL. This is the concept one should use
instead or referring to the theory as being causally complete. That is a misnomer because
firstly, the idea of causality does not apply to the physics laws per se (although effective
theories do), and secondly because causal completion - the set of conditions that actually
determine what outcomes will occur in real-world contexts - is always an interlevel affair,
no single level L by itself is causally complete (Section 6.6). Effective Theories represent
verifiable patterns of causation at the relevant level, not causal closure [Ellis 2020b].
6The cautionary note reflects the difficulty in establishing reliable relations at levels L6-L8. The
theories may have to be described in terms of propensities rather than mathematical laws. They are nev-
ertheless well established fields of study, for example [Gray and Bjorklund 2018] at Level L6, [Berger 1963]
at Level L7, and [Houghton 2009] at Level L8.
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Effective theory examples It is useful to give some examples of effective theories at
different levels. It is my contention, in agreement with [Noble 2012] [Noble 2016], that
real causal processes are going on at each of these levels, even though this is enabled by
underlying levels, including the physics ones. The relevant effective theories are more than
just useful descriptions of high level processes. In all but the last two cases this is demon-
strated by the fact that evolution has selected genomes that result in them happening.
Their causal effectiveness is a driver of evolutionary selection.
1. Gene regulation The kind of gene regulatory processes discovered by Jacob and
Monod [Jacob and Monod 1961] [Monod 1971] represent real causal processes at the
cellular level (they require the relevant molecular processes, but can only take place
in the context of a functioning cell [Hofmeyer 2018]). Their importance is that they
underlie the Evo-Devo processes discussed in [Carroll 2005] [Carroll 2008].
2. Action potential propagation Brain processes are supported at the micro level by
propagation of action potential spikes according to the Hodgkin-Huxley Equations
[Hodgkin and Huxley 1952]. This is an emergent phenomenon that cannot be de-
duced from the underlying physics per se because they involve constants that are
not fundamental physical constants. [Woodward 2018] defends the view that the
explanation the equations provide are causal in the interventionist sense.
3. The brain The way the brain works overall [Kandel 2012] [Gray and Bjorklund 2018]
is based in the underlying neuroscience [Kandel et al 2013]. It has been arrived at
by an evolutionary process based in the advantages its specific functioning provides.
Two key issues are the ability to function under uncertainty [Clark 2013] [Clark 2016]
[Hohwy 2013] [Hohwy 2016] and the existence of a symbolic ability [Deacon 1997]
that allows language, culture, and technology to arise [Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019].
4. Natural Selection Natural selection [Mayr 2001] is a meta-principle: it is a process of
downward causation [Campbell 1974] that allows the others listed above to come into
being. Because the biological needs listed above are attractor states in the adaptive
landscape [McGhee 2011], evolutionary convergence takes place [McGhee 2006]: that
is, there are multiple ways they can be met. Any physiological implementation in the
equivalence class that satisfies the need will do. Thus this is an example of multiple
realisability (Section 2.6), which characterizes topdown causation [Ellis 2016].
5. Smoking, lung cancer, and death The relation between smoking and lung cancer
is an established causal link, as discussed in depth in [Pearl and Mackenzie 2018]. It
can certainly be redescribed at the physics level, but the key concepts in the correla-
tion - smoking, cancer - cannot. Therefore, starting off with an initial state described
at the microphysics level, one cannot even in principle determine the probabilities
of cancer occurring on the basis of those variables alone, let alone when death will
occur as a result of the cancer, because death also cannot be described at that level.
Once cancer occurs (at the genetic/cellular levels L3/L4) leading to death (at the
whole organism level L6) this will alter physical outcomes at the ion/electron level
L2 because the process of life (see above) has ceased. This is a real causal chain,
not just a handy redescription of micro physics: smoking causes cancer and then
death as a matter of fact. The physics allows this of course, but the actual physical
trajectories and outcomes follows from the essential higher level dynamics of the
cessation of being alive.
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2.4 Equal Validity of Levels
There is a valid Effective Theory ETL at each level L, each of them represents a causally
valid theory holding at its level, none more fundamental than the others. This is expressed
nicely in [Schweber 1993], commenting on Phil Anderson’s views:
“Anderson believes in emergent laws. He holds the view that each level has its
own “fundamental” laws and its own ontology. Translated into the language of
particle physicists, Anderson would say each level has its effective Lagrangian
and its set of quasistable particles. In each level the effective Lagrangian - the
“fundamental” description at that level - is the best we can do.”
None of them can be deemed to be more fundamental than any other, inter alia because
none of them is the fundamental level, i.e. none is the hoped for Theory of Everything
(TOE). This has to be the case because we don’t know the underlying TOE, if there is
one, and so don’t - and can’t - use it in real applications. So all the physics laws we use
in applications are effective theories in the sense of [Castellani 2002], applicable at the
appropriate level. Similarly, there are very well tested effective theories at levels L3-L5 in
biology: the molecular level, the cellular level, the physiological systems level for example.
Whenever there are well established laws at the higher levels (for example the laws of
perception at Level L6) the same applies to them too.
More fundamentally, this equal causal validity occurs because higher levels are linked to
lower levels by a combination of upwards and downwards causation [Noble 2012] [Noble 2016]
so no level by itself is causally complete. They interact with each other with each level
playing a role in causal completeness. Hence ([Noble 2016]:160),
The Principle of Biological Relativity: There is no privileged level of
causation in biology: living organisms are multi-level open stochastic systems
in which the behaviour at any level depends on higher and lower levels and
cannot be fully understood in isolation
This is because of circular causality which for example necessarily involves downward
causation from the whole cell to influence the behaviour of its molecules just as much
as upward causation form the molecular level to the cellular level [Noble 2016]:163-164).
This applies to all levels in Table 1, i.e. it includes the underlying physics levels as well
[Ellis and Kopel 2019] [Ellis 2020b], as has to be the case for physical consistency.
In the case of the brain, after having set out in depth the hierarchical structure of
the brain ([Churchland and Sejnowski 2016]:11,27-48), Churchland and Sejnowski state
([Churchland and Sejnowski 2016]:415)
“An explanation of higher level phenomena in terms of lower level phenom-
ena is usually referred to as a reduction, though not in the perjorative sense
that implies the higher levels are unreal, explanatorily dismissable, or somehow
empirically dubious”,
which agrees with the view put here. Brain computational processes have real causal
power [Marr 2010] [Scott 2002] [Churchland and Sejnowski 2016].
2.5 Types of causation
Causation can be characterised either in an interventionist or a counterfactual sense, either
indicating when causation takes place [Pearl 2009] [Pearl and Mackenzie 2018]. The first
key claim I make is that as well as upward causation, downward causation takes place
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[Noble 2012] [Ellis 2016]. The second one is that as well as efficient causation, Aristotle’s
other forms of causation play a key role in real world outcomes.
Downward causation Physicists take for granted upward causation, leading to emer-
gence through aggregation effects such as coarse graining. However one can claim there
is also downward causation that occurs via various mechanisms [Noble 2008] [Ellis 2012]
[Ellis 2016], allowing strong emergence [Chalmers 2000] to occur. Carlo agrees downward
causation takes place, but believes it can be rewritten purely in terms of low level physics,
and hence does not represent strong emergence.
Downwards effects in a biological system occur because of physiological processes
[Noble 2008], [Noble 2012]. These processes [Hall 2016] are mediated at the molecular
level by developmental systems [Oyama et al 2001] operating through metabolic and gene
regulator networks [Wagner 2014] and cell signalling networks [Berridge 2014], guided by
higher level physiological needs. They reach down to the underlying physical level L2
via time dependent constraints [Ellis and Kopel 2019]. The set of interactions between
elements at that level is uniquely characterised by the laws of physics L, but their specific
outcomes are determined by the biological context in which they operate.
An example is determination of heart rate. Pacemaker activity of the heart is via
cells in the sinoatrial node that create an action potential and so alter ion channel out-
comes. This pacemaking circuit is an integrative characteristic of the system as a whole
[Fink and Noble 2008] - that is, it is an essentially higher level variable - that acts down
to the molecular level [Noble 2012] [Noble 2016]. In the synchronic case - nothing changes
at either macro or micro levels - it is correct that one can predict the lower level and hence
the higher level dynamics purely from the lower level initial state. However if the higher
level state changes - an athlete starts running - the higher level state changes, and this
alters lower level conditions. Nothing about the initial molecular level state of the heart
or the underlying physics state could predict this happening. Neither could initial knowl-
edge of both the athletes heart and brain micro states determine this outcome, because it
depended on an external event - the firing of the starting gun, another macro level event
which the athlete’s initial states cannot determine.
Considering the individual athlete, causation at the macro level is real: the firing of the
starting gun led to her leaving the starting post. Downward causation that alters motion
of ATP molecules in her muscles via metabolic networks is real: that is a well established
physiological process [Rhoades and Pflanzer 1989]. The result is altered electron flows in
the muscles, in a way consistent with the laws of physics but unpredictable from her initial
microphysical state. Regression to include the brain state of the person firing the gun will
not save the situation, as one then has to include all the influences on his brain state
[Noble et al 2019] as well as all the stochastic elements in his brain (Section 5.3).
A similar example of a rhythmic pattern determined by a network as a whole is the
stomatogastric ganglion of the spiny lobster ([Churchland and Sejnowski 2016]:4-5):
“The network in question contains about 28 neurons and serves to drive the
muscles controlling the teeth of the gastric mill so that food can be ground
up for digestion. The output of the network is rhythmic, and hence the mus-
cular action and the grinders movements are correspondingly rhythmic. The
basic electrophysiological and anatomical features of the neurons have been cat-
alogued, so that the microlevel vitae for each cell in the network is impressively
detailed. What is not understood is how the cells in the network interact to
constitute a circuit that produces the rhythmic pattern. No one cell is a repos-
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itory for the cells rhythmic output; no one cell is itself the repository for the
properties displayed by the network as a whole. Where then does the rhythmic-
ity come from? Very roughly speaking, from the patterns of interactions among
cells and the intrinsic properties of the component cells.
The network produces rhythmic patterns in the cells, which produce rhythmic activity
in the constitutive electrons and ions. This is a classic example of higher level order
controlling both macro and micro level outcomes.
Types of downward causation The basic type of downward causation are as follows
(developed from [Ellis 2012] [Noble 2012] [Noble 2016] [Ellis 2016]):
TD1A Boundary conditions are constraints on particles in a system arising from the
environment7 as in the case of a cylinder determining pressure and temperature of
the enclosed gas, or the shape of tongue and lips determining air vibrations and so
spoken words. Structural Constraints are fairly rigid structures that determine
possible micro states of particles that make up the structure, as in the case of a
cylinder constraining the motion of a piston, or a skeleton that supports a body.
TD1B Channeling and Containing constraints are key forms of contextual causation
shaping microbiological and neural outcomes. Channeling constraints determine
where reactants or electrical currents can flow, as in blood capillaries in a body, wires
in a computer, or neural axons and dendrites in a brain. Containing constraints
confine reactants to a limited region, so preventing them from diffusing away and
providing the context for reaction networks to function. A key case is a cell wall.
TD2A Gating and signalling constraints Gating constraints control ingress and
egress to a container, as in the case of voltage gated ion channels in axons, or ligand
gated ion channels in synapses. They function via conformational changes controlled
by voltage differential in the former case, and molecular recognition of ligands in the
latter case, thus underlying cell signalling processes [Berridge 2014].
TD2B Feedback control to attain goals is a cybernetic process where the difference
between a goal and the actual state of a system generates an error signal that is fed
back to a controller and causes corrective action, as in thermostats and engine gover-
nors [Wiener 1948]. In biology this is homeostasis, a crucial feature of physiology at
all levels [Hall 2016]. Because of this closed causal loop, goals determine outcomes.
Changing the goals changes both macro and micro outcomes, as in altering the set-
ting on a thermostat. In biology, multilevel homeostatic systems are continually
responding to internal changes and external perturbations [Billman 2020].
TD3A Creation of New Elements takes place in two ways. Creation of new
lower level elements occurs in physics when crystal level conditions create quasi-
particles such as phonons that play a key role in dynamics at the electron level
[Ellis 2020a]. This is what [Gillett 2019] calls a Downward Constitutive relation.
It occurs in biology when genes are read to create proteins, a contextual process
[Gilbert and Epel 2009] controlled by gene regulatory networks according to higher
level needs [Noble 2016]. Creation of new higher level elements restructures
lower level relations and so alters lower level dynamics. In engineering this takes
7Carlo’s example of Jupiter causing tides on Earth fits here: Jupiter is part of the Earth’s environment,
causing a detectable gravitational field at Marseilles.
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place by manufacturing processes such as making a transistor. In biology this oc-
curs when cell division takes place at the cellular level, and when an organism gives
birth to progeny at the organism level. The context of lower level dynamics changes
completely in both cases. In the latter case, as Darwin already recognised, sexual
selection takes place and determines outcomes, involving very complex social and
psychological interactions that alter outcomes at the genetic and physical levels.
TD3B Deleting or Altering Lower Level elements is the complementary process
that is crucial in biology. In developmental biology, apoptosis (programmed cell
death) plays a key role for example in digit formation (separating fingers and thumbs),
while in neural development, synaptic connections are pruned as development takes
place [Wolpert et al 2002]. Cell are specialised to perform specific functions as
growth takes place, altering their nature and behaviour. A fundamental biologi-
cal process is Adaptive selection due to selection criteria which alters either
the set of lower level elements by deletion as in Darwinian selection [Campbell 1974]
and the functioning of the immune system, or selecting optimal configurations, as in
neural network plasticity involved in learning.
The higher level types of downward causation: TD4 (Adaptive selection of goals) and
TD5 (Adaptive selection of selection criteria) build on these ones [Ellis 2012] [Ellis 2016].
The key issue is whether any of these types of downward causation are really causally
effective, or just redescriptions in convenient form of microphysical causation.
Aristotle’s kinds of causation There is an important further point as regards causa-
tion. As Aristotle pointed out [Bodnar 2018], there are four kinds of causation that occur
in the real world. This is discussed by ([Juarrero 2002]:2,125-128,143) ([Noble 2016]:176-
179) and ([Scott 2002]:298-300) They are
• Material Cause: the physical stuff that is needed for an outcome; the stuff out of
which it is made, e.g., the bronze of a statue. In biology this is the physical stuff, the
chemical elements as characterised by the periodic table, that make biology possible.
• Formal Cause: which makes anything what it is and no other; the material cause
necessary for some outcome must be given the appropriate form through the way
in which the material is arranged e.g., the shape of a statue. In biology, this is the
structure at each level that underlies function at that level: physiological systems
[Hall 2016] and the underlying biomolecules such as proteins [Petsko and Ringe 2009].
• Efficient Cause: The primary source of the change or rest, the force that brings
an action into being; nowadays in the Newtonian case taken to be the effect of forces
on inert matter, in the quantum chemistry case, Schro¨dinger’s equation.
• Final Cause: the goal or purpose towards which something aims: “that for the
sake of which a thing is done”.
Physics only considers efficient causes [Juarrero 2002]. Biology however needs material,
formal, and efficient causes. [Hofmeyer 2018] gives a careful analysis of how the relation
between them can be represented and how they are are realised in biology, giving as an
example an enzyme that catalyses a reaction. He explains that a set of rules, a convention
or code, forms an interface between formal and efficient cause.
All four kinds of causation are needed to determine specific outcomes in social contexts,
which is the context within which brains function. Without taking them all into account,
one cannot even account for existence of a teapot [Ellis 2005].
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A network of causation is always in action when any specific outcomes occurs. When
we refer to ‘The Cause’, we are taking all the others for granted - the existence of the
Universe, of laws of physics of a specific nature, and of the Earth for example.
Tinbergen’s ‘Why’ questions In biology, an alternative view on causation is provided
by Tinbergen’s four ‘Why’ questions. [Bateson and Laland 2013] summarise thus:
“Tinbergen pointed out that four fundamentally different types of problem are
raised in biology, which he listed as ‘survival value’, ‘ontogeny’, ‘evolution’,
and ‘causation’. These problems can be expressed as four questions about any
feature of an organism: What is it for? How did it develop during the lifetime
of the individual? How did it evolve over the history of the species? And, how
does it work?”
That is, he raises functional, developmental, evolutionary, and mechanistic issues that
all have to be answered in order to give a full explanation of existence, structure, and
behaviour of an organism.
2.6 Multiple Realisability
A key point is that multiple realisability plays a fundamental role in strong emergence
[Menzies 2003]. Any particular higher level state can be realised in a multiplicity of ways
in terms of lower level states. In engineering or biological cases, a high level need deter-
mines the high level function and thus a high level structure that fulfills it. This higher
structure is realised by suitable lower level structures, but there are billions of ways this
can happen. It does not matter which of the equivalence class of lower level realisations is
used to fulfill the higher level need, as long as it is indeed fulfilled. Consequently you can-
not even express the dynamics driving what is happening in a sensible way at a lower level.
Consider for example the statements The piston is moving because hot gas on one side
is driving it and A mouse is growing because the cells that make up its body are dividing.
They cannot sensibly be described at any lower level not just because of the billions of lower
level particles involved in each case, but because there are so many billions of different
ways this could happen at the lower level, this cannot be expressed sensibly at the proton
and electron level. The point is the huge number of different combinations of lower level
entities can represent a single higher level variable. Any one of the entire equivalence class
at the lower level will do. Thus it is not the individual variables at the lower level that
are the key to what is going on: it is the equivalence class to which they belong. But that
whole equivalence class can be describer by a single variable at the macro level, so that is
the real effective variable in the dynamics. This is a kind of interlevel duality:
{vL ∈ L} ⇔ {vi : vi ∈ EL-1(vL-1) ∈ (L-1)} (4)
where EL-1(vL-1) is the equivalence class of variables vL-1 at Level L-1 corresponding to
the one variable vL at Level L. The effective law EFL at Level L for the variables vL at
that level is equivalent to a law for an entire equivalence class EL-1(vL-1) of variables at
Level L-1. It does not translate into an Effective Law for natural variables vL-1 per se at
Level L-1.
The importance of multiple realisability is discussed in [Menzies 2003] [Ellis 2019] and
[Bishop and Ellis 2020].
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Essentially higher level variables and dynamics The higher level concepts
are indispensible when multiple realisability occurs, firstly because they define
the space of data dL relevant at Level L, and secondly because of (4), variables
in this space cannot be represented as natural kinds at the lower level. Effective
Laws EFL at level L can only be expressed at level L-1 in terms of an entire
equivalence class at that level. One can only define that equivalence class by
using concepts defined at level L.
To inject reality into this fact, remember that the equivalence class at the lower level is
typically characterised by Avagadro’s number.
2.7 Higher Level Organising Principles
A key issue in the discussion is the degree to which higher level dynamics depends on the
lower level dynamics. As can be seen from the previous subsections, the nature of biological
causation is quite unlike the nature of causation at the underlying physical levels. What
determines these outcomes then?
Higher Level Organising Principles The key idea here is that higher level biological
Organising Principles exist that are independent of the underlying lower level dynamics,
and shape higher level outcomes. The specific lower level realisation is immaterial, as long
as it is in the right equivalence class (Section 2.6). Generically they form attractors that
shape higher level outcomes [Juarrero 2002]152-162; the lower level components come along
for the ride, with many biological oscillators being examples ([Noble 2016]:76-86,179).
Protectorates This is parallel to the claim by [Laughlin and Pines 2000] of existence
of classical and quantum protectorates, governed by dynamical rules that characterise
emergent systems as such. They state
“There are higher organising principles in physics, such as localization and
the principle of continuous symmetry breaking, that cannot be deduced from
microscopics even in principle. ... The crystalline state is the simplest known
example of a quantum protectorate, a stable state of matter whose generic low-
energy properties are determined by a higher organizing principle and nothing
else... they are transcendent in that they would continue to be true and lead to
exact results even if the underlying Theory of Everything was changed.
As an example, [Haken 1996] states that profound analogies between different systems
become apparent at the order parameter level, and suggest that the occurrence of order
parameters in open systems is a general law of nature. He characterizes this in terms of a
slaving principle8 [Haken and Wunderlin 1988]. [Green and Batterman 2020] develop this
further, citing the universality of critical phenomena as a physics case. The Renormalisa-
tion Group explanation extracts structural features that stabilize macroscopic phenomena
irrespective of changes in microscopic details
Biology In biology, such organising principles can be claimed to govern microbiology,
physiology, and neuroscience (Sections 2.1 and 4). The idea is that once life exists and
evolutionary processes have started, they are what shape outcomes, rather than the un-
derlying physical laws, because they express essential biological needs [Kauffman 1995].
8I thank Karl Friston for this comment.
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Physical laws of course allow the outcomes to occur: they lie within the Possibil-
ity Space ΩL of outcomes allowed by the physical laws L, for instance the proteins en-
abling all this to occur are characterised by a possibility space of huge dimension, as
are the metabolic networks and gene regulatory networks that lead to specific outcomes
[Wagner 2014]. But as emergence takes place through developmental processes repeated
many many times over evolutionary timescales, it is these principles that determine biolog-
ical success. Hence [Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019] it is they that determine evolutionary
outcomes in an ongoing Evo-Devo process [Carroll 2005] [Carroll 2008]. They act as at-
tractors for both evolution and for ongoing brain dynamics.
This proposal is supported in multiple ways.
In functional terms, homeostasis is a central organising principle in all physiology
at multiple scales: “It is important to note that homeostatic regulation is not merely the
product of a single negative feedback cycle but reflects the complex interaction of multiple
feedback systems that can be modified by higher control centers” [Billman 2020]. Also phys-
iological functions acting as dynamical systems have attractors that organise outcomes.
For example, this happens in the neural dynamics of cell assemblies ([Scott 2002]:244-248):
“In Hopfield’s formulation, each attractor is viewed as a pattern stored non-
locally by the net. Each such pattern will have a basin of attraction into which
the system can be forced by sensory inputs.”
Thus cell assemblies form attractors ([Scott 2002]:287). Also Hopfield neural networks
converge to attractors in an energy landscape [Churchland and Sejnowski 2016]:88-89) and
attractor networks are implemented by recurrent collaterals ([Rolls 2016]:75-98).
In developmental terms it can be expressed in terms of Waddington’s epigenetic
landscape [Gilbert 1991] ([Noble 2016]:169,259) which presents much the same idea via
cell fate bifurcation diagrams. This is how developmental processes converge on outcomes
based in the same higher level organising principles.
In evolutionary terms, it can be expressed in terms of the adaptive landscape of
Sewell Wright [Wright 1932l] [McGhee 2006], showing how evolution converges to adaptive
peaks where these principles are supported to a greater or lesser degree. This viewpoint
is supported by much evidence for convergent evolution [McGhee 2011].
Neuroscience There is a huge amount written about neuroscience and biological psy-
chology, with a vast amount of detail: [Scott 2002] [Purves et al 2008] [Kandel et al 2013]
[Churchland and Sejnowski 2016] [Clark 2016] [Gray and Bjorklund 2018] for example.
The issue is, Can one extract higher level organising principles for the brain from them?
I believe one can, examples being hierarchical predictive coding [Clark 2013] and the Free
Energy Principle [Friston 2010]. I collect them together in the following three sections,
looking at how the brain handles the constant influx of new data (Section 3), the issue of
constantly adjusting to the environment (Section 4), and how the brain uses micro level
stochasticity to allow macro level agency (Section 5). I suggest that it is these principles at
the macro level that are the real determinants of what happens, solving the puzzle of how
ordered outcomes can emerge in the context of an open system, where the microdynamic
states of an individual brain cannot in principle determine future outcomes because they
do not have the data necessary to do so.
If that is correct, these principles reach down to determine micro level outcomes via the
various mechanisms outlined in Section 2.5. Furthermore they are themselves attractors in
evolutionary space: they will tend to come into existence because they enhance prospects
of reproductive success [Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019].
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3 The Predictive Brain: Brains as open systems
Each human body, and each brain, is an open system. This is where the difference between
synchronic and diachronic emergence is crucial. It has two aspects: our brains are not
made of the same matter as time progresses (Section 3.1), and new information is coming in
all the time and altering our brain states (Section 3.2). The way this is interpreted depends
on the fact that our brain is an emotional brain (Section 3.3) and a social brain (Section
3.4). Language and symbolism enables abstract and social variables to affect outcomes
(Section 3.5). Consequently the microphysical state of a specific person’s brain is unable
as a matter of principle to predict their future brain states (Section 3.6) Predictive brains
that can handle this situation are attractor states for brain evolutionary development.
3.1 Matter and Metabolism: We are not the same molecules
Because we are open systems [Peacocke 1989], the human body at time t2 > t1 is not
made of the same material particles as it was at time t1. Thus what happens in life is like
the case of a candle ([Scott 2002]:303):
“As a simple example of an open system, consider the flame of a candle. ..
Because the flame is an open system, a relation P1 → P2 cannot be written -
even “in principle”- for the physical substrate. This follows from the fact that
the physical substrate is continually changing. The molecules of air and wax
vapour comprising the flame at time t2 are entirely different from those at time
t1. Thus the detailed speeds and positions of the molecules present at time t2
are unrelated to those at time t1. What remains constant is the flame itself -
a process.”
Body maintenance: A balance between protein synthesis and protein degradation is
required for good health and normal protein metabolism. Protein turnover is the re-
placement of older proteins as they are broken down within the cell, so the atoms and
elementary particles making up the cell change too. Over time, the human body is not
even made up of the same particles: they turn over completely on a timescale of 7 years
[Eden et al 2011] [Toyama and Hetzer 2013]
The brain Neuroscientist Terence Sejnowski states:9
‘‘Patterns of neural activity can indeed modify a lot of molecular machinery
inside a neuron. I have been puzzled by my ability to remember my childhood,
despite the fact that most of the molecules in my body today are not the same
ones I had as a child; in particular, the molecules that make up my brain are
constantly turning over, being replaced with newly minted molecules. ”
Metabolic networks ensure the needed replacements take place on a continuous basis,
despite stochasticity at the molecular level (Section 5). This is where multiple realisability
plays a key role (Section 2.6).
Conclusion Initial data for the specific set of particles making up a specific
brain at time t1 cannot determine emergent outcomes uniquely for that brain
over time, for it is not made of the same set of particles at time t2 ≫ t1.
9https://www.edge.org/response-detail/10451
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3.2 Dealing with New Information: The Predictive Brain
That effect of course takes time. The very significant immediate ongoing effect of being
an open system is that incoming sensory information conveys masses of new data on an
ongoing basis. This new data may contain surprises, for example a ball smashes a window.
The brain has to have mechanisms to deal with such unpredictability: the previously stored
data at the microphysics level cannot do so, as it does not take this event into account.
Hierarchical predictive coding Indeed, the brain has developed mechanisms to make
sense of the unpredictable inflow of data and best way react to it [Clark 2013] [Clark 2016]
[Hohwy 2013] [Hohwy 2016] [Szafron 2019]. Andy Clark explains [Clark 2013]:
“Brains, it has recently been argued, are essentially prediction machines. They
are bundles of cells that support perception and action by constantly attempting
to match incoming sensory inputs with top-down expectations or predictions.
This is achieved using a hierarchical generative model that aims to minimize
prediction error within a bidirectional cascade of cortical processing. Such ac-
counts offer a unifying model of perception and action, illuminate the func-
tional role of attention, and may neatly capture the special contribution of
cortical processing to adaptive success. This ‘hierarchical prediction machine’
approach offers the best clue yet to the shape of a unified science of mind and
action.”
In brief, following up Ross Ashby’s notion that “the whole function of the brain is summed
up in error correction,” the following takes place in an ongoing cycle:
PB1 Hierarchical generative model The cortex uses a hierarchical model to generate
predictions of internal and external conditions at time t2 on the basis of data available
at time t1.
PB2 Prediction error and attention During the interval [t1, t2] sensory systems (vi-
sion, hearing, somatosensory) receive new information on external conditions and
internal states At time t2, nuclei in the thalamus compare the predictions with the
incoming data. If it exceeds a threshold, an error signal (‘surprisal’) is sent to the
cortex to update its model of the internal and external situation (Bayesian updating),
and focus attention on the discrepancy.
PB3 Action and outcomes The updated model is used to plan and implement action.
The impact of that action on the external world provides new data that can be used
to further update the model of the external world (active intervention).
This is an interlevel information exchange as described by ([Rao and Ballard 1999]:80):
“Prediction and error-correction cycles occur concurrently throughout the hier-
archy, so top-down information influences lower-level estimates, and bottomup
information influences higher-level estimates of the input signal”.
The outcome [Hohwy 2007] is (as quoted in [Clark 2013]),
“The generative model providing the “top-down”predictions is here doing much
of the more traditionally “perceptual” work, with the bottom up driving sig-
nals really providing a kind of ongoing feedback on their activity (by fitting,
or failing to fit, the cascade of downward-flowing predictions). This procedure
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combines“top-down” and “bottom-up” influences in an especially delicate and
potent fashion, and it leads to the development of neurons that exhibit a “selec-
tivity that is not intrinsic to the area but depends on interactions across levels
of a processing hierarchy” ([Friston 2003], p.1349). Hierarchical predictive cod-
ing delivers, that is to say, a processing regime in which context-sensitivity is
fundamental and pervasive”.
Perception Consequently, perception is a predictive affair [Purves 2010]. Helmholz’s
inverse problem (how to uniquely determine a 3-d world from a 2-d projection) is solved
by filling in missing information on the basis of our expectations. ([Kandel 2012]:202-204)
gives a overview of how this understanding originated with Helmholz, who called this top-
down process of hypothesis testing unconscious inference, and was developed by Gombrich
in his book Art and Illusion [Gombrich 1961]. [Kandel 2012] (pages 304-321) emphasizes
the top-down aspect of this process, and its relation to memory. [Purves 2010](pp.120-124)
describes how he came to the same understanding (see also page 221).
Action The relation to action is given by [Friston 2003] [Friston et al 2009] [Clark 2013].
It is described thus by ([Hawkins and Blakeslee 2007]:158)
“As strange as it sounds, when your own behaviour is involved, your predic-
tions not only precede sensation, they determine sensation. Thinking of going
to the next pattern in a sequence causes a cascading prediction of what you
should experience next. As the cascading prediction unfolds, it generates the
motor commands necessary to fulfill the prediction. Thinking, predicting, and
doing are all part of the same unfolding of sequences moving down the cortical
hierarchy.”
[Seth 2013] summarised the whole interaction thus:
“The concept of Predictive Coding (PC) overturns classical notions of per-
ception as a largely ‘bottom-up’ process of evidence accumulation or feature
detection, proposing instead that perceptual content is specified by top-down
predictive signals that emerge from hierarchically organized generative models
of the causes of sensory signals. According to PC, the brain is continuously
attempting to minimize the discrepancy or ‘prediction error’ between its inputs
and its emerging models of the causes of these inputs via neural computations
approximating Bayesian inference. Prediction errors can be minimized either
by updating generative models (perceptual inference and learning; changing the
model to fit the world) or by performing actions to bring about sensory states
in line with predictions (active inference; changing the world to fit the model”
This is a very brief sketch of a very complex program, summarised in Andy Clark’s book
Surfing Uncertainty [Clark 2016] and in [Miller and Clark 2018]. Nothing here contradicts
the mechanisms discussed in depth in texts such as [Purves et al 2008] [Kandel et al 2013]
[Churchland and Sejnowski 2016]. Those texts set the foundations for what is proposed
above, but do not develop these aspects in depth. For example [Kandel et al 2013] has
just one relevant section: “Visual perception is a creative process” (page 492).
Thus the viewpoint put here accepts the mechanisms discussed in those books (and the
underlying physics), and puts them in a larger context that emphasizes overall organising
features that are crucial in enabling the brain to function in the face of uncertainty.
However there are three further important aspects to be taken into account.
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3.3 The emotional brain
A first further crucial aspect of our brains is that they are emotional brains. The
understandings and actions enabled by the predictive mechanisms mentioned above are
crucially affected and shaped by affective (emotional) states.
The cognitive science paradigm of purely rational choice is not the way the real brain
works. Emotion has key effects on cognition [Damasio 2006] and behaviour [Panksepp 2009]
[Purves et al 2008] [Panksepp and Biven 2012] [Gray and Bjorklund 2018].
EB1 The emotional brain Both primary (innate) and secondary (social) emotions play
a key role in guiding cognition and focusing attention.
The predictive coding paradigm can be extended ([Clark 2016]:231-237) to include this
case. [Seth 2013] says the following
“The concept of the brain as a prediction machine has enjoyed a resurgence
in the context of the Bayesian brain and predictive coding approaches within
cognitive science. To date, this perspective has been applied primarily to extero-
ceptive perception (e.g., vision, audition), and action. Here, I describe a predic-
tive, inferential perspective on interoception: ‘interoceptive inference’ conceives
of subjective feeling states (emotions) as arising from actively-inferred gener-
ative (predictive) models of the causes of interoceptive afferents. The model
generalizes ‘appraisal’ theories that view emotions as emerging from cognitive
evaluations of physiological changes ... interoceptive inference involves hier-
archically cascading top-down interoceptive predictions that counterflow with
bottom-up interoceptive prediction errors. Subjective feeling states - experi-
enced emotions - are hypothesized to depend on the integrated content of these
predictive representations across multiple levels ”
[Miller and Clark 2018] develop this crucial emotional relationship to cortical activity in
depth, using the predictive coding framework:
“But how, if at all, do emotions and sub-cortical contributions fit into this
emerging picture? The fit, we shall argue, is both profound and potentially
transformative. In the picture we develop, online cognitive function cannot
be assigned to either the cortical or the sub-cortical component, but instead
emerges from their tight co-ordination. This tight co-ordination involves pro-
cesses of continuous reciprocal causation that weave together bodily information
and ‘top-down’ predictions, generating a unified sense of what’s out there and
why it matters. The upshot is a more truly ‘embodied’ vision of the predictive
brain in action.”
As well as influencing immediate functioning of the brain, affect relates crucially to brain
plasticity and so to changes in brain micro structure (Section 5.4).
3.4 The social brain
Second, a crucial aspect of our brains is that they are social brains: we are evolved
to live in a social context, which has key influences on our lives and minds as the brain
receives data and responds to the situation around. Sociality appears to be a main driver
for human brain evolution [Dunbar 1998] [Dunbar 2003] and results in social cognition
([Purves et al 2008]:359-392) and cognitive neuroscience [Cacioppo et al 2002]. This again
crucially affects how we handle the incoming information.
25
The advantage of social brains Living in cooperative groups greatly enhanced our
ancestors survival prospects [Harari 2014] enabling the rise of cooperative farming, culture,
and technology, which then was the key to the emergence of civilisation that enabled our
dominance over the planet [Bronowski 2011]. A social brain was needed for social cohesion
to emerge: the cognitive demands of living in complexly bonded social groups selected
increasing executive brain (neocortical) size [Dunbar 1998a] [Dunbar 2014].
The nature of the social brain: Theory of Mind It is not just a matter of being
cooperative and able to communicate: central to the social brain is the ability known as
“theory of mind” (ToM) [Dunbar 1998a]. It is very important that we can read other peo-
ples minds (understanding their intentions) - which we do on an ongoing basis [Frith 2013].
We all have a theory of mind [Frith and Frith 2005]. Its cortical basis is discussed by
[Frith 2007], but additionally it has a key precortical base related to the primary emotional
systems identified by [Panksepp 2009], namely the very strong emotional need to belong to
a group [Panksepp and Biven 2012] [Ellis and Toronchuk 2013] [Stevens and Price 2015]
Its evolutionary basis is discussed by [Donald 1991] [Tomasello 2009] [Dunbar 2014].
It is summed up by ([Donald 2001]:86-87) as follows:
“Our normal focus is social, and social awareness is highly conscious, that
is, it heavily engages our conscious capacity... Conscious updating is vital to
social life ... One might even make the case that consciousness- especially
our lightning fast, up-to-date, socially attuned human consciousness - is the
evolutionary requirement for both constructing and navigating human culture.
It remains the basis, the sine qua non, for all complex human interactions”.
Michael Tomasello agrees, as is evident in the title of his book The Cultural Origin of
Human Cognition [Tomasello 2009].
Relation to predictive coding The description of the social brain in terms of the
predictive processing paradigm is presented by [Constant et al 2019] through the concept
of the extended mind:10
“Cognitive niche construction is construed as a form of instrumental intel-
ligence, whereby organisms create and maintain cause-effect models of their
niche as guides for fitness influencing behavior. Extended mind theory claims
that cognitive processes extend beyond the brain to include predictable states
of the world that function as cognitive extensions to support the performance
of certain cognitive tasks. Predictive processing in cognitive science assumes
that organisms (and their brains) embody predictive models of the world that
are leveraged to guide adaptive behavior. On that view, standard cognitive
functions - such as action, perception and learning - are geared towards the
optimization of the organism’s predictive (i.e., generative) models of the world.
Recent developments in predictive processing - known as active inference - sug-
gest that niche construction is an emergent strategy for optimizing generative
models.
Those models include models of social context and of other minds, characterised via cul-
tural affordances [Ramstead et al 2016]. [Veissie´re et al 2020] state
10See also [Kirchhoff et al 2018] and [Hesp et al 2019].
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“We argue that human agents learn the shared habits, norms, and expectations
of their culture through immersive participation in patterned cultural practices
that selectively pattern attention and behaviour. We call this process“Thinking
Through Other Mind” (TTOM) - in effect, the process of inferring other agents’
expectations about the world and how to behave in social context. ”
Then downward causation from the social environment changes the brain:
“The brain only has direct access to the way its sensory states fluctuate (i.e.,
sensory input), and not the causes of those inputs, which it must learn to guide
adaptive action - where ‘adaptive’ action solicits familiar, unsurprising (inte-
roceptive and exteroceptive) sensations from the world. The brain overcomes
this problematic seclusion by matching the statistical organization of its states
to the statistical structure of causal regularities in the world. To do so, the
brain needs to re-shape itself, self-organizing so as to expect, and be ready to
respond with effective action to patterned changes in its sensory states that
correspond to adaptively relevant changes ‘out there’ in the world”
The sociology of this all is discussed by [Berger 1963] and [Berger and Luckmann 1991].
Overall, one can summarise as follows:
SB1 The social brain Because we live in a social world we are very socially aware. We
have a social brain which shapes our responses to incoming data in crucial ways on
the basis of social understandings, which are continually changing over time.
Theory of mind is based in prediction, and is a routine part of everyday life [Frith 2013].
3.5 The symbolic brain
Third, a key feature of the social brain is its ability to engage in spoken and written
language, and more generally to engage in symbolism. This adds in a whole new category
of incoming information that the brain has to take into account and respond to.
Language A key step in evolution of mind is developing language. [Dunbar 1998a]
suggests its prime function is to enable exchange of information regarding bonding in
the social group. It is a product of a mind-culture symbiosis ([Donald 2001]:11,202) and
forms the basis of culture ([Donald 2001]:274), symbolic technologies ([Donald 2001]:305),
as well as cultural learning ([Tomasello 2009]:6) and inheritance ([Tomasello 2009]:13).
[Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019] Language enables sharing ideas and information over time
and distance, and enables the social and psychological power of stories [Gottschall 2012].
Abstract and social variables In evolutionary terms, the transition to the symbolic
species [Deacon 1997] enabled abstract causation [Ellis and Kopel 2019] to occur, which
inter alia involves social interactions and abstract concepts such as the amount of money
in my bank account and the concept of a closed corporation [Harari 2014]. Thus not all
the relevant variables are physical variables; some are abstract variables resulting from
social interactions [Berger 1963] [Berger and Luckmann 1991] which are causally effective.
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Higher order predictability Symbolism and abstract reasoning greatly increases our
power of prediction: we can simulate situations offline, rather than having to enact them to
see what the consequences are. It also greatly increases the complexity of our responses to
incoming social data, which are interpreted in the light of the social context [Berger 1963]
[Berger and Luckmann 1991] [Donald 2001] [Frith 2013]
SB2 The symbolic brain Human social interaction is based in language, in turn based
in our symbolic ability. This ability transforms the way our minds interpret much
incoming data, as well as allowing internal cognitive processes that are a major causal
factor in our individual and social lives.
This is the fundamental mechanism by which the brain operates at a macro level, for which
there is much evidence. Again one can claim that this is the way the brain operates as a
matter of fact, it is not just the way we think it operates. Causation at this level is real:
the whole of society depends on it.
This will play an important role in Section 6 because it relates to the interaction of
the brain to the outside world.
3.6 The Dynamics of the Open Brain
An individual brain considered as an entity on its own is an open system, and has been
adapted to handle the problems this represents in successfully navigating the world. This
rather than initial brain micro data determines it specific outcomes as time progresses.
Microphysics data for brain states Consider a specific individual brain at time t1.
During a time interval [t1, t2], the initial brain microphysics data D(t1) is added to by
new data Dext(t) coming from the environment after t1. The data D(t2) at a later time
t2 > t1 is not predictable even in principle from D(t1). Hence the microphysics evolution
is undetermined by data D(t1), even in principle. You may for example see a car crash
at a time t3 > t1 that alters all the future brain states; but your brain did not know that
was going to happen.
Thus the brain as an open system receives unexpected information and handles it in a
predictive way. The initial state of the brain obviously cannot determine these outcomes
as it has no control over what the incoming data will be. This is the key outcome of the
difference between synchronic and diachronic emergence.
The brain is an open system Initial micro data of a brain state at one
moment cannot possibly determine what it will do at a later time, not
just because new matter comes in and replaces old, but also because
new information comes in from outside and alters outcomes. The
initial data at time t1 cannot know what the initial data at time t2 will
be and hence cannot determine specific later brain outcomes. The
brain handles this uncertainty via the predictive brain mechanisms
PB1-PB3, EB1, SB1-SB2 outlined above.
The physicalist gambit is to say ah yes, but microphysics determines uniquely the evolution
of all the other systems the brain is interacting, so the system as a whole is determined
by the microphysics dynamics alone. I respond to that proposal in Section 6.
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Predictive Brain Mechanisms as Attractor states Evolutionary processes will hone
in on these predictive brain mechanisms as attractor states. This occurs via the mechanism
of exploration and selective stabilisation recognised independently by Changeaux and by
Edelman ([Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019]:119-123,247-248).
Thus these mechanisms can be claimed to be Higher Order Principles (see Section
2.7) for brain structure and function. It is their remarkable properties that shape brain
structure, and its functioning in the face of the unpredictable flow of incoming data.
4 The Learning Brain: Plasticity and Adaptation
In carrying out these responses to incoming information, remembering and learning takes
place; indeed this is a pre-requisite for functioning of predictive brain mechanisms. This
adds a new dimension to the effects just discussed: not only is the new data unpredictable,
but also brain structure is changed in ways affected by that inflow of new data. Thus the
context for microphysics outcomes - the specific set of constraints determining electron
and ion flow possibilities - is also different at the later time.
Plasticity at the macro level as the brain adapts to its environment, remembers, and
learns [Gray and Bjorklund 2018] is enabled by corresponding changes at the micro level
as neural networks weights change [Kandel et al 2013] [Churchland and Sejnowski 2016].
Thus changes take place at the micro level (Section 4.1) driven by incoming data at the
macro level, and resulting in plasticity at the macro level (Section 4.2). Because brain
neural nets are changing all the time, the context for outcomes of the underlying physics
is also changing all the time (Section 4.3) and is not predictable from the initial brain
physical microstate.
4.1 Plasticity at the micro level
Learning takes place by change of connectivity and weights in neural networks at the
neuronal level [Kandel et al 2013] [Churchland and Sejnowski 2016], taking place via gene
regulation at the cellular level [Kandel 2001]. This alters the context within which electron
and ion flows take place in neural networks and in particular at synapses, thereby shaping
outcomes of the underlying universal physical laws.
Developmental processes This plasticity occurs particularly when brain development
is taking place. Random initial connections are refined ([Wolpert et al 2002]: §11) and
new experiences can modify the original set of neuronal connections ([Gilbert 1991]:642)
while the brain is responding to the surrounding environment ([Purves 2010]:§2-§5, 229).
Learning Processes Erik Kandel explored the mechanism of learning in depth. He
identified gene regulatory process related to learning [Kandel 2001]
“Serotonin acts on specific receptors in the presynaptic terminals of the sensory
neuron to enhance transmitter release. ... during long-term memory storage,
a tightly controlled cascade of gene activation is switched on, with memory-
suppressor genes providing a threshold or checkpoint for memory storage ...
With both implicit and explicit memory there are stages in memory that are
encoded as changes in synaptic strength and that correlate with the behavioral
phases of short- and long-term memory”
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The relation to physics These changes alter the context within which the underlying
physics operates. Changing constraints at the microphysics level is the mechanism of
downward causation to that level [Ellis and Kopel 2019]. This determines what dynamics
actually takes place at the ion/electron level, which of course the fundamental laws by
themselves cannot do. The outcomes are determined by biological context in this way.
LB1 The Developing and Learning Brain The brain is plastic at the micro level, as
development and learning takes place. Neural network connections and weights are
altered via gene regulatory processes.
Thus neural network learning [Churchland and Sejnowski 2016] - a real causal process at
each network level - alters electron outcomes and so later psychological level dynamics.
4.2 Plasticity at the macro level
Eric Kandel states “One of the most remarkable aspects of an animal’s behavior is the
ability to modify that behavior by learning” [Kandel 2001], and emphasizes that social
factors affect this learning. [Kandel 1998] gives five principles for psychotherapy that
make this clear. For those who are skeptical of psychotherapy, replace that word with
‘teaching’ or ‘coaching’ in the following, and its crucial meaning still comes through.
Kandel Principle 1 All mental processes, even the most complex psychological pro-
cesses, derive from operations of the brain. The central tenet of this view is that
what we commonly call mind is a range of functions carried out by the brain. The
actions of the brain underlie not only relatively simple motor behaviors, such as walk-
ing and eating, but all of the complex cognitive actions, conscious and unconscious,
that we associate with specifically human behavior, such as thinking, speaking, and
creating works of literature, music, and art.
Kandel Principle 2 Genes and their protein products are important determinants of
the pattern of interconnections between neurons in the brain and the details of
their functioning. Genes, and specifically combinations of genes, therefore exert
a significant control over behavior. ... the transcriptional function of a gene - the
ability of a given gene to direct the manufacture of specific proteins in any given cell -
is, in fact, highly regulated, and this regulation is responsive to environmental factors
... the regulation of gene expression by social factors makes all bodily functions,
including all functions of the brain, susceptible to social influences.
Kandel Principle 3 Behavior itself can also modify gene expression. Altered genes do
not, by themselves, explain all of the variance of a given major mental illness. Social
or developmental factors also contribute very importantly. Just as combinations of
genes contribute to behavior, including social behavior, so can behavior and social
factors exert actions on the brain by feeding back upon it to modify the expression
of genes and thus the function of nerve cells. Learning ...produces alterations in gene
expression.
Kandel Principles 4/5 How does altered gene expression lead to the stable alterations
of a mental process? Alterations in gene expression induced by learning give rise
to changes in patterns of neuronal connections. These changes not only contribute
to the biological basis of individuality but strengthen the effectiveness of existing
patterns of connections, also changing cortical connections to accommodate new
patterns of actions.... resulting in long-lasting effect on the the anatomical pattern
of interconnections between nerve cells of the brain.
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The hierarchical predictive coding view The way this all fits into the predictive
coding viewpoint discussed in the last section is explained by [Rao and Ballard 1999].
Overall the outcomes can be summarised thus:
LB2 The Learning Brain The brain is plastic at the macro level as learning takes
place, supported by plasticity at the micro level. Learning at the macrolevel responds
to social and psychological variables.
4.3 The ever adapting brain
The previous section emphasized, in the case of a single brain, that because of incoming
data, the microstate at time t2 cannot be predicted from initial data at time t1 < t2
because it does not include this incoming data. This section emphasizes that in addition,
the micro level constraints are changed because neural network wiring or weights will have
changed as the brain adapts at both macro and micro levels to ongoing environmental
events and changes. So not only is the data different than expected because the brain is
an open system, but the dynamical context for the underlying physics is different too.
The brain is an adaptive system. Individual brain structure changes
in response to incoming data. As new information comes in, neural
network weights are continually changed via gene regulation. This
change of context alters constraints in the underlying Lagrangian,
and so changes the context for future physical interactions. None
of this can be determined by the initial brain micro data at time t1,
as these changes are shaped by data that has come in since then.
This is a further reason why diachronic emergence is crucially different from synchronic.
Adapting and learning brains as attractor states Evolutionary processes will hone
also in on these learning brain mechanisms as attractor states, via the mechanism of
exploration and selective stabilisation recognised independently by Changeaux and by
Edelman ([Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019]:119-123,247-248).
5 The Stochastic Brain and Agency
A key feature undermining physicalist determinism of brain states is the stochasticity that
occurs in biology at the molecular level, which uncouples biology from detailed Laplacian
determinism. Section 5.1 discusses this stochasticity, and Section 5.2 how this opens up
the way for selecting desired low level outcomes that will fulfill higher level purposes - one
of the key forms of downward causation. Section 5.3 discusses how this applies specifically
to the brain. A key way that randomness is used in shaping the brain is Neural Darwinism
(Section 5.4). The issue of how agency is possible arises, and this is essentially via multi
level causal closure that takes advantage of this selective process (Section 5.5).
This shows how biological stochasticity opens up the way to higher level biological
needs acting as attractors that shape brain dynamics, rather than brain outcomes being
the result purely of deterministic or statistical lower level physical dynamics. All of this
can again be traced out at the underlying physics level, but it is the biology that is the
essential causal factor through setting the context for physical outcomes.
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5.1 Biology and stochasticity
There is massive stochasticity at the molecular level in biology. This undoes Laplacian de-
terminism at the micro level: it decouples molecular outcomes from details of initial data at
the molecular level. How then does order emerge? By biology harnessing this stochasticity
to produce desirable higher level results, as happens for example in the case of molecular
machines [Hoffmann 2012] and the adaptive immune system [Noble and Noble 2018].
Stochasticity and molecular machines As described in Hoffman’s book Life’s ratchet:
how molecular machines extract order from chaos [Hoffmann 2012] biomolecules live in a
cell where a molecular storm occurs. Every molecular machine in our cells is hit by a
fast-moving water molecule about every 10−13 seconds. He states
“At the nanoscale, not only is the molecular storm an overwhelming force, but
it is also completely random.”
The details of the initial data molecular positions and momenta) are simply lost. To
extract order from this chaos, “one must make a machine that could ‘harvest’ favorable
pushes from the random hits it receives.” That is how biology works at this level.
Stochasticity in gene expression Variation occurs in the expression levels of proteins
[Chang et al 2008]. This is a property of the population as a whole not of single cells, so
the distribution curve showing the number of cells displaying various levels of expression
is an attractor created by the population ([Noble 2016]:175-176). Promoter architecture
is an ancient mechanism to control expression variation [Sigalova et al 2020]. Thus one
must use stochastic modeling of biochemical and genetic networks ([Ingalls 2013]:280-295)
when determining their outcomes. This affects the detailed physical outcomes of memory
processes based in gene regulation [Kandel 2001].
Stochasticity in genetic variation The processes of genetic variation before selection
are mutation and recombination [Alberts 2007], drift [Masel 2011], and migration. They
all are subject to stochastic fluctuations. Mutations arise spontaneously at low frequency
owing to the chemical instability of purine and pyrimidine bases and to errors during DNA
replication [Lodish et al 2000]. Because evolution is a random walk in a state space with
dimension given by the number of the different strategies present [Geritz et al 1997] this
shapes evolutionary outcomes in a way that is unpredictable on the basis of microphysics
data. This has key present day outcomes in terms of ongoing mutations of microbes and
viruses on the one hand, and of immune system responses on the other, both of which
are based in taking advantage of stochasticity [Noble and Noble 2018]. The statistics of
outcomes however can be studied in terms of evolution over a rugged fitness landscape
[Gillespie 1984] [Kauffman and Levin 1987] [Felsenstein 1988] [Orr 2005]. Small fluctua-
tions can end up in a different attractor basin or adaptive peak.
The microbiome A key factor in physiology is that our bodies contain many billions of
microbes that affect bodily functioning and health. This is being studied in depth by the
Human Microbiome Project [Peterson etal 2009] and the Integrative Human Microbiome
Project [Integrative H. M. P. 2014] [Integrative H. M. P. 2019].
Thousands of microbial species, possessing millions of genes, live within humans: in
the gastrointestinal and urogenital tracts, in the mouth: 1018, in the nose, in the lungs:
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109/ml, on the skin: 1012. This leads to infectious diseases (rheumatic fever, hepati-
tis, measles, mumps, TB, AIDS, inflammatory bowel disease) and allergic/autoimmune
diseases (Asthma, diabetes, multiple sclerosis, Croon’s disease).
Because of the stochasticity in gene mutation, recombination, and horizontal gene
transfer, and the huge numbers involved, together with the impossibility of setting data
to infinite precision (§6.1), evolution of specific outcomes is unpredictable in principle, but
has major macro level outcomes for individuals.
5.2 Stochasticity and selection in biology
This level of stochasticity raises a real problem: how could reliable higher levels of biolog-
ical order, such as functioning of metabolic and gene regulatory networks and consequent
reliable development of an embryo [Wolpert et al 2002], emerge from this layer of chaos?
The answer is that evolutionary processes have selected for biological structures that
can successfully extract order from the chaos. These structures in turn use the same
mechanism: they select for biologically desirable outcomes from an ensemble of physical
possibilities presented by this underlying randomness. Higher level biological needs may
be satisfied this way. As stated by [Noble and Noble 2018]:
“Organisms can harness stochasticity through which they can generate many
possible solutions to environmental challenges. They must then employ a com-
parator to find the solution that fits the challenge. What therefore is un-
predictable in prospect can become comprehensible in retrospect. Harnessing
stochastic and/or chaotic processes is essential to the ability of organisms to
have agency and to make choices.
This is the opposite of the Laplacian dream of the physical interactions of the underlying
particles leading to emergent outcomes purely on the basis of the nature of those inter-
actions. It is the detailed structure of molecular machines, together with the lock and
key molecular recognition mechanism used in molecular signalling [Berridge 2014], that
enables the logic of biological processes to emerge as effective theories governing dynamics
at the molecular level. They exist in the form they do because of the higher level organis-
ing principles that take over. The emergent levels of order appear because they are based
in higher level organising principles characterising emergent protectorates as described by
[Laughlin and Pines 2000] (see Section 2.7). For example Friston’s Free Energy Principle
[Friston 2010] [Friston 2012] is such a higher level organising principle. It does not follow
from the microphysical laws. In fact all the higher level Effective Theories ETL (Section
2.4) characterise such Higher Level Organising principles.
STB1 Variation leads to a variety of states, from which outcomes are selected;
States that fulfill biological functions are attractor states for function and
hence for evolution and development.
This agrees with ([Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019]:245)
“Biological attractors are usually functional - the mechanisms enabling them to
be reached reliably, in spite of different starting conditions, evolved by natural
selection”.
This is the process exploration and selective stabilisation mechanism that is described in
([Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019]:119-123,247-248). The driving of the process by biological
needs is the reason that convergent evolution occurs [McGhee 2011].
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5.3 The brain and stochasticity
There are various kinds of stochasticity in brain function, apart from the fact that it
involves necessarily the stochasticity in molecular dynamics just discussed.
Stochasticity in Neural Activity The neural code is spike chains [Rieke et al 1999]
where [Shadlen and Newsoms 1994] the timing of successive action potentials is highly
irregular. Also fluctuations in cortical excitability occur [Stephani et al 2020]. This results
in stochasticity in neural outcomes [Glimcher 2005] in contrast to deterministic dynamics,
suggesting an organising principle [Stephani et al 2020]:
“Brain responses vary considerably from moment to moment, even to identical
sensory stimuli. This has been attributed to changes in instantaneous neuronal
states determining the system’s excitability. Yet the spatio-temporal organiza-
tion of these dynamics remains poorly understood. .... criticality may repre-
sent a parsimonious organizing principle of variability in stimulus-related brain
processes on a cortical level, possibly reflecting a delicate equilibrium between
robustness and flexibility of neural responses to external stimuli.”
This stochasticity allows higher level organising principles such as attractors to shape neu-
ral outcomes in decision making in the brain [Rolls and Deco 2010] [Deco at al 2009]. The
higher level structure of attractor networks [Rolls 2016]:95-134) determines outcomes. A
particular case where a randomisation and selection process is used is Boltzmann machines
and annealing ([Churchland and Sejnowski 2016]:89-91). This demonstrates the principle
that stochasticity greatly enhances efficiency in reaching attractor states [Palmer 2020].
Creativity A key feature of mental life is creativity, which has transformed human life
both through inventiveness in science (Maxwell, Turing, Bardeen, Townes, Cormack, and
so on) and in commerce (Gates, Jobs, Zuckerberg, Bezos, and so on). It has been proposed
([Rolls 2016]:137) that the possibility of creativity is an outcome of stochasticity due to
random spiking of neurons, resulting in a brain state being able to switch from one basin
of attraction to another.
The gut-brain axis The body microbiome (Section 5.1) has a key influence on the
brain. Effects are as follows [Cryan et al 2019]
“The microbiota and the brain communicate with each other via various routes
including the immune system, tryptophan metabolism, the vagus nerve and the
enteric nervous system, involving microbial metabolites such as short-chain
fatty acids, branched chain amino acids, and peptidoglycans. Many factors
can influence microbiota composition in early life, including infection, mode
of birth delivery, use of antibiotic medications, the nature of nutritional pro-
vision, environmental factors, and host genetics. At the other extreme of life,
microbial diversity diminishes with aging. Stress, in particular, can signifi-
cantly impact the microbiota-gut-brain axis at all stages of life. Much recent
work has implicated the gut microbiota in many conditions including autism,
anxiety, obesity, schizophrenia, Parkinson’s disease, and Alzheimer’s disease.”
It is also involved in neurodegenerative disease [Rosario Iet al 2020]. Because of the un-
predictability of how the microbiome will develop, both due to the stochasticity of its
genetic mutation and the randomness of the microbes imported from the environment,
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the specific outcomes of these interactions are unpredictable from initial micro biological
data in an individual body, and hence a fortiori from knowledge of the details of the un-
derlying physical level. One can however study the statistics of molecular evolution over
the mutational landscape [Gillespie 1984] [Kauffman and Levin 1987].
Note that not all the key factors determining outcomes are purely microbiological or
physiological: stress, a mental state, is a key factor in its dynamics.
5.4 Neural Plasticity and Neural Darwinism
As well as changing neural network weights [Churchland and Sejnowski 2016] via gene
regulatory networks[Kandel 2001], neural plasticity during development involves pruning
connections that were initially made randomly [Wolpert et al 2002] as learning takes place.
An important way variation and selection happens is via Neural Darwinism (or
Neuronal Group Selection) [Edelman 1987] [Edelman 1993]. This is a process where neu-
ral connections are altered by neuromodulators such as dopamine and serotonin that
are diffusely spread from precortical nuclei to cortical areas via ‘ascending systems’.
They then modify weights of all neurons that are active at that time, thus at one shot
strengthening or weakening an entire pattern of activation - a vary powerful mechanism.
This mechanism ([Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019]:119-123,247-248) was also discovered by
[Changeux and Danchin 1976]. [Seth and Baars 2005] describe these processes thus:
“In the brain, selectionism applies both to neural development and to moment-
to-moment functioning. Edelman postulates two overlapping phases of devel-
opmental and experiential variation and selection. The first is the formation
during development of a primary repertoire of many neuronal groups by cell
division, migration, selective cell death, and the growth of axons and dendrites.
This primary repertoire of neurons is epigenetically constructed through a suite
of genetic and environmental influences, and generates a high level of diversity
in the nascent nervous system. The second, experiential, phase involves the
dynamic formation from this primary repertoire of a secondary repertoire of
functional neuronal groups, by the strengthening and weakening of synapses
through experience and behavior. This phase involves the selective amplifica-
tion of functional connectivities among the neurons produced in the first phase,
with which it overlaps. In this manner, an enormous diversity of anatomical
and functional circuits is produced”
This provides a key mechanism for experientially based selection of connectivity patterns.
Primary Emotions An important feature of Edelman’s theory is that the subcortical
nuclei involved, as well as the neuromodulators, are precisely the same as are involved
in Jaak Panksepp’s primary emotional systems [Panksepp 2009] (Section 3.3). Hence the
theory is in fact a theory of Affective Neural Darwinism [Ellis and Toronchuk 2005]
[Ellis and Toronchuk 2013], making clear the importance of affect (emotion) for brain plas-
ticity and learning.
STB2 Stochasticity and Neural Darwinism Brain plasticity is affected by neu-
romodulators diffusely projected to the cortex from nuclei in subcorti-
cal arousal system via ascending systems, selecting neuronal groups for
strengthening or weakening. In this way emotions affect neural plasticity.
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This is a key way that interactions at the social level reach down to alter brain connections
and hence the context of physical interactions in the brain. It is a specific example of the
‘vary and select’ topdown process (Section 2.5: TD3B) that plays a key role in all biology.
5.5 Agency, Self-Causation, and Causal Closure
Agency clearly takes place at the psychological level. People plan and, with greater or
lesser success, carry out those plans [Gray and Bjorklund 2018], thus altering features of
the physical world. In this way, technological developments such as farming and metallurgy
and abstract ideas such as the design of an aircraft or a digital computer have causal power
[Ellis 2016] and alter history [Bronowski 2011].
The emergent psychological dynamics of the brain demonstrably has real causal powers.
So how does such agency occur?
Self-causing systems Agency is centrally related to the idea of a self-causing sys-
tem. The idea of a system is crucial, “an integration of parts into an orderly whole
that functions as an organic unity” ([Juarrero 2002]:108-111). This enables self-causation
([Juarrero 2002]:252):
“Complex adaptive systems exhibit true self-cause: parts interact to produce
novel, emergent wholes; in turn these distributed wholes as wholes regulate and
constrain the parts that make them up”.
([Murphy and Brown 2007]:85-104) develop the theme further, emphasizing firstly how a
complex adaptive system represents the emergence of a system with a capacity to control
itself. Secondly, agency is related to the variation and selection process emphasized here:
the dynamical organisation of a complex adaptive system functions as an internal selection
process, established by the system itself, that operates top-down to preserve and enhance
itself. This process is an example of the interlevel causal closure that is central to biology
[Mossio 2013] [Ellis 2020b]. It leads to the circularity of the embodied mind [Fuchs 2020]:
“From an embodied and enactive point of view, the mind-body problem has
been reformulated as the relation between the lived or subject body on the one
hand and the physiological or object body on the other. The aim of the paper
is to explore the concept of circularity as a means of explaining the relation
between the phenomenology of lived experience and the dynamics of organism-
environment interactions. .. It will be developed in a threefold way:
(1) As the circular structure of embodiment, which manifests itself (a) in the
homeostatic cycles between the brain and body and (b) in the sensorimotor
cycles between the brain, body, and environment. This includes the interdepen-
dence of an organism’s dispositions of sense-making and the affordances of the
environment.
(2) As the circular causality, which characterizes the relation between parts and
whole within the living organism as well as within the organism-environment
system.
(3) As the circularity of process and structure in development and learning.
Here, it will be argued that subjective experience constitutes a process of sense-
making that implies (neuro-)physiological processes so as to form modified neu-
ronal structures, which in turn enable altered future interactions.
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On this basis, embodied experience may ultimately be conceived as the integra-
tion of brain-body and body-environment interactions, which has a top-down,
formative, or ordering effect on physiological processes.”
This is also related to the Information Closure theory of consciousness [Chang et al 2020].:
“We hypothesize that conscious processes are processes which form non-trivial informa-
tional closure (NTIC) with respect to the environment at certain coarse-grained scales.
This hypothesis implies that conscious experience is confined due to informational closure
from conscious processing to other coarse-grained scales.”
The predictive coding view Intentional action is a process of agent selection from
various possibilities. This possibility of agency is congruent with the predictive coding
view, as three examples will demonstrate. Firstly [Seth et al 2012] state,
“We describe a theoretical model of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying
conscious presence and its disturbances. The model is based on interoceptive
prediction error and is informed by predictive models of agency, general mod-
els of hierarchical predictive coding and dopamine signaling in cortex ...The
model associates presence with successful suppression by top-down predictions
of informative interoceptive signals evoked by autonomic control signals and,
indirectly, by visceral responses to afferent sensory signals. The model connects
presence to agency by allowing that predicted interoceptive signals will depend
on whether afferent sensory signals are determined, by a parallel predictive-
coding mechanism, to be self-generated or externally caused.”
Secondly [Negru 2018] puts it this way:
“The aim of this paper is to extend the discussion on the free-energy principle
(FEP), from the predictive coding theory, which is an explanatory theory of the
brain, to the problem of autonomy of self-organizing living systems. From the
point of view of self-organization of living systems, FEP implies that biological
organisms, due to the systemic coupling with the world, are characterized by
an ongoing flow of exchanging information and energy with the environment,
which has to be controlled in order to maintain the integrity of the organism.
In terms of dynamical system theory, this means that living systems have a
dynamic state space, which can be configured by the way they control the free-
energy. In the process of controlling their free-energy and modeling of the
state space, an important role is played by the anticipatory structures of the
organisms, which would reduce the external surprises and adjust the behavior
of the organism by anticipating the changes in the environment. In this way,
in the dynamic state space of a living system new behavioral patterns emerge
enabling new degrees of freedom at the level of the whole.”
Finally [Szafron 2019] characterizes it thus:
“ Using the Free Energy Principle and Active Inference framework, I describe a
particular mechanism for intentional action selection via consciously imagined
goal realization, where contrasts between desired and present states influence
ongoing neural activity/policy selection via predictive coding mechanisms and
backward-chained imaginings (as self-realizing predictions). A radically embod-
ied developmental legacy suggests that these imaginings may be intentionally
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shaped by (internalized) partially-expressed motor predictions and mental simu-
lations, so providing a means for agentic control of attention, working memory,
and behavior.”
The overall result is a final higher level organising principle that acts as an attractor state
during evolution:
STB3 Stochasticity and Agency Stochasticity at the micro level allows macro level dy-
namics to select preferred micro outcomes, thus freeing higher levels from the tyranny
of domination by lower levels. By this mechanism, downward selection of preferred
micro outcomes enables self-causation and agency.
The big picture is that randomness is rife in biology. Evolutionary processes have adapted
biological systems to take advantage of this [Hoffmann 2012], with higher level processes
selecting preferred outcomes from a variety of possibilities at the lower levels, thereby
enabling the higher level organising principles characterised in the previous two sections to
shape physical outcomes [Noble and Noble 2018]. The underlying physics enables this, but
does not by itself determine the particular outcomes that occur, for they are contextually
determined via time dependent dynamical constraints ([Juarrero 2002]:131-162).
6 The Whole Universe Gambit and Causal Closure
The hardcore reductionist responds to the previous sections by saying yes the brain is an
open system, but the universe as a whole is not. Extend your micro data to include all the
particles in the universe - well, in the region of the universe that is causally connected to us
(i.e inside the particle horizon [Hawking and Ellis 1973]) - and it is then causally closed.
All the data incoming to the brain is determined by causally complete microphysical
processes in this extended domain, hence brain outcomes are determined by them too.
The response, denying that this can work, has many levels. Please note that as stated
before I am concerned with the possibility of physics determining specific outcomes, such
as the words in Carlo’s emails, not just statistical outcomes. His emails did not contain a
statistical jumble of letters or words: they contained rational arguments stated coherently.
This is what has to be explained. The question is how the underlying physics relates to
such specific rational outcomes.
In order of increasing practical importance the issues are as follows.
First, Section 6.1 denies that the micro physical level is in fact causally complete,
because of irreducible quantum indeterminism. While this can indeed have an effect on
the brain, its primary importance is to deny that physics at the micro level is in principle
causally complete.
Second, Section 6.2 makes the case that even if the incoming data was determined
uniquely by microphysics everywhere in the surroundings, they would not determine a
unique brain micro state in any individual because of the multiple realisability of macro
states by microstates (§2.6).
Third, Section 6.3 makes the case that important aspects of macro physics are in prac-
tice indeterminate because of the combination of chaotic dynamics and the impossibility
of specifying initial data to infinite precision. This has neural outcomes inter alia because
it applies to weather patterns and forest fires.
Fourth, Section 6.4 points out that there is considerable randomness in the external
world biology that the mind interacts with at both micro and macro levels. These biological
outcomes are not precisely predictable from their micro physics initial data. It has key
impacts on the mind related in particular to the relations between humans and viruses.
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Fifth, Section 6.5 points out that because the brain is a social brain (§3.4), its macro
level responses to incoming data are not purely mechanical: they are highly sophisticated
responses at the psychological level to social interactions. These are affected by unpre-
dictable effects such as weather and pandemics. By the mechanisms discussed in Section
4, these understandings reach down to structure the neural context of brain microphysics.
Finally Section 6.6 makes the case that the larger environment interacts with the brain
by providing the setting for interlevel circular causation. This can be claimed to be the
real nature of causal closure. It is what is involved in order to have the data, constraints,
and boundary conditions needed to determine specific outcomes in real world contexts,
enabling self-causation. This is the opposite of being determined by microphysics alone.
6.1 Is micro physics causally complete?
Carlo’s argument is that micro data dependence of all outcomes undermines the possibil-
ity of strong emergence. To summarise, suppose I am given the initial positions ri and
momenta pi of all particles in the set P everywhere,
11 where
P := (protons, neutron, electrons) (5)
at a foundational level L1. At a higher level L2 this constitute an emergent structure S,
such as a neural network. The details of S are determined by the microdata, even though
its nature cannot be recognised or described at level L1. The forces between the particles
at level L1 completely determine the dynamics at level L1. Hence the emergent outcomes
at level L2 are fully determined by the data at level L1, so the emergence of dynamical
properties and outcomes at level L2 must be weak emergence and be predictable, at least
in principle, from the state (5) of level L1, even if carrying out the relevant computations
is not possible in practice. This would apply equally to physical, engineering, and bio-
logical emergent systems. It is in effect a restatement of the argument from supervenience.
There are problems with the argument just stated as regards both microphysics and macro-
physics.
Quantum physics uncertainty relation The Heisenberg uncertainty relations under-
mine this Laplacian dream because initial data cannot be specified with arbitrary accuracy
[Heisenberg 1949]. The standard deviations of position σx and momentum σp obeys
σxσp ≥ ~/2 (6)
[Kennard 1927], so one cannot in principle set initial data precisely at level L1. Conse-
quently, outcomes based on standard Lagrangians dependent on x and p are uncertain in
principle.
Essentially the same issue arise in the case of classical physics [Del Santo and Gisin 2019]
because data cannot be prescribed to infinite accuracy [Ellis et al 2018]. Further in the
quasi-classical approximation, it will be subject to the uncertainty (6), reinforcing that
conclusion [Del Santo 2020]. This affects outcomes of chaotic dynamics (§6.3).
Irreducible uncertainty in quantum outcomes There is irreducible uncertainty of
quantum outcomes when wave function collapse to an eigenstate takes place, with out-
comes only predictable statistically via the Born rule [Ghirardi 2007]. One cannot for
11“Everywhere” means within the particle horizon [Hawking and Ellis 1973].
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example predict when an excited atom will emit a high energy photon, one can only
predict the probability of such an event This unpredictability has consequences that can
get amplified to macrolevels, for example causing errors in computer memories due to
cosmic rays [Ziegler and Lanford 1979] [Gorman et al 1996]. The specific errors that oc-
cur are not determined by physics, because quantum physics is foundationally causally
incomplete.
Biological damage due to cosmic rays Cosmic rays can alter genes significantly
enough to cause cancer. In particular, galactic cosmic rays lead to significant fatal-
ity risks for long-term space missions. This is discussed in [Cucinotta and Cacao 2017]
[Cucinotta et al 2017] [Cekanaviciute et al 2018] This shows both the contextual depen-
dence of local outcomes in this case, and their unpredictability in principle.
Unpredictable brain effects This obviously can affect the mental processes of those
undertaking space travel. The brain can be affected crucially by distant events that are
in principle unpredictable because they result from quantum decay of excited atoms.
The statistics of outcomes is strictly predicted by quantum theory. But in terms
of causal completeness of biological events, we wish to know which specific person gets
affected at what specific time, thereby changing individual thought patterns. Detailed
microphysical initial data everywhere cannot tell us that.
This is a situation that only affects a small number of people, but it is important
because it establishes that in principle the physicalist whole world gambit does not work
(after all, that argument is an in principle argument: no one argues that it can work in
practice in terms of allowing actual predictions of unique biological outcomes).
6.2 Mental states and multiple realisability
Incoming sensory data in a real world context affects brain macrostates which then shape
micro level connections via learning. But they do not do so in a unique way: incoming
sensory data does determine unique brain microstates because of the multiple realisability
of higher level states at the physical level.
Mental states and multiple realisability A given set of incoming data does not
result in a unique brain physical microstate because of multiple realisability of the higher
level state at the lower level (Section 2.6). This is a key property of brain function.
[Silberstein and McGeever 1999] state
“Functionalists (and others) claim that mental states are radically multi-realizable,
i.e., that mental states like believing that p and desiring that p can be multiply
realized within individual across time, across individuals of the same species,
across species themselves, and across physical kinds such as robots. If this
is true, it raises crucial question: why do these states always have the same
behavioural effects? In general we expect physically similar states to have sim-
ilar effects and different ones to have different effects. So some explanation
is required of why physically disparate systems produce the same behavioural
effects. If there is nothing physically common to the ‘realizations’ of a given
mental state, then there is no possibility of any uniform naturalistic explanation
of why the states give rise to the same mental and physical outcomes.”
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The brain responds to incoming data via the predictive processing mechanisms discussed
in Section 3.2 , with updating of the relevant expectations taking place all the time on the
basis of experience. The macro psychological processes that occur in this way reach down
to shape neural network connections and weights [Kandel 2001] [Kandel 1998] in ways that
are not unique. These then change constraints at the electron/ion level, realising any one
of the billions of possible changes at that level that are in the right equivalence class.
Unpredictable brain effects Unique micro level physical conditions in the brain (the
specific details of constraints in the electron/ion Lagrangian that will determine the ongo-
ing brain dynamics) cannot in principle be determined by incoming data from the external
world because of multiple realisability. Ordered outcomes appear at the brain macro level
according to the predictive coding logic outlined in Section 5.3, which then activates any
one of the microstates in the corresponding equivalence class at the micro level (Section
2.6). All of this can of course be traced at the microphysical level, both internal to the
brain and externally. But what is driving it is psychological level understandings.
6.3 Is macro physics causally complete?
The atmosphere is an open system dynamically driven by the Sun’s radiation, and with
vary complex interactions taking place between the atmosphere, subject to winds and con-
vection, water (the seas and lakes and clouds and ice), and land [Ghil and Lucarini 2020].
These are unpredictable in detail because of chaotic dynamics.
Convection patterns Consider a higher physical level L3 in the context of a fluid where
convection patterns take place. Because of the associated chaotic dynamics together with
the impossibility (6) of setting initial data to infinite precision (Section 6.1), macroscopic
outcomes are unpredictable in principle from micro data (5) . Convection patterns are an
example [Bishop 2008]: an extremely small perturbation in a fluid trapped between two
levels where a heat differential is maintained can influence the particular kind of convection
that arises. [Anderson 2001] puts it this way:
“A fluid dynamicist when studying the chaotic outcome of convection in a
Benard cell knows to a gnat’s eyelash the equations of motion of this fluid
but also knows, through the operation of those equations of motion, that the
details of the outcome are fundamentally unpredictable, although he hopes to
get to understand the gross behaviour. This aspect is an example of a very
general reality: the existence of universal law does not, in general, produce
deterministic, cause-and-effect behaviour.”
The outcome is an emergent layer of unpredictability at both local scales (thunderstorms,
tornados, typhoons, and so on) and globally (large scale weather outcomes). The lat-
ter are famously characterised by strange attractors [Lorenz 1963], involving instability
and fractals, but much more importantly interactions between different length scales
that make prediction impossible in principle [Lorenz 1969], as discussed in depth by
[Palmer et al 2014]. Downward constraints then entrains lower level dynamics to follow, as
stated by [Bishop 2012]: “Large-scale structures arise out of fluid molecules, but they also
dynamically condition or constrain the contributions the fluid molecules can make, namely
by modifying or selecting which states of motion are accessible to the fluid molecules”.
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The Butterfly Effect Lorenz intended the phrase ‘the butterfly effect’ to describe
the existence of an absolute finite-time predictability barrier in certain multi-scale fluid
systems, implying a breakdown of continuous dependence on initial conditions for large
enough forecast lead times [Palmer et al 2014]. [Lorenz 1969] states
“It is proposed that certain formally deterministic fluid systems which possess
many scales of motion are observationally indistinguishable from indetermin-
istic systems. Specifically, that two states of the system differing initially by a
small observational error will evolve into two states differing as greatly as ran-
domly chosen states of the system within a finite time interval, which cannot
be lengthened by reducing the amplitude of the initial error.”
This happens because of the interactions between the different length scales involved.
Palmer’s illuminating paper [Palmer et al 2014] concludes that this real butterfly effect12
does indeed occur - but only for some particular sets of initial data. Nevertheless occur-
ring from time to time denies causal closure of physics on this scale in practice. That
clearly means the underlying physics at the particle level cannot have been causally closed
either. The multiscale weather dynamics studied by [Lorenz 1969] reaches down to influ-
ence atomic and electron motions (think thunderstorms) at the lower physics level. But
this is the crucial point: you cannot predict when those cases will occur.
Forest Fires are an example of self-organised critical behaviour [Malamud et al 1998]
affected by local atmospheric convection activity in that firstly many forest fires are cased
by lightning13, and secondly the spread of the fire is determined by local winds which are
changed by local convection effects due to the fire. The detailed dynamics of the fire are
unpredictable because of these links; even probabilities are tricky [Mata et al 2010].
Unpredictable brain effects In terms of the effect on the brain, these random out-
comes shape decisions from whether to open an umbrella on a trip to the shops, to farmers’
decisions as to when to harvest crops, aircraft pilots decisions about en route flight plan-
ning, and homeowners decisions about whether or not to flee a forest fire. It causes an
essential unpredictability in mental outcomes. This is a first reason the external world has
an ongoing unpredictable key effect on individual brains.
6.4 Biological Randomness: the Microbiome
Biological dynamics in the external world are subject to unavoidable uncertainty because
of the random nature of molecular level events, already alluded to in Section 5.1.
Interacting microbiomes and viruses The immense complexity of each individual
person’s microbiome (Section 5.1) interacts, through social events, with other people’s
microbiomes, as do their viruses. Genetic variability is central to the mutation of microbes
and viruses in the external world. Detailed physical microstates everywhere determine
the statistics of such variations, but not the specific ones that actually occur, which are
due inter alia to mutation and recombination and horizontal gene transfer in the case
of microbes, mistakes by RNA or DNA polymerases, radiation- or chemical- or host cell
defences-induced mutation, and re-assortment in the case of viruses. Predicting mutations
12See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vkQEqXAz44I for an enlightening lecture on the common
and real butterfly effects. The implication is that you need ensemble forecasts.
13Dry Thunderstorms Could Accelerate the California Wildfires,
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is essentially impossible, even for viruses with 10, 000 bases like HIV. All you CAN say
is that the known mutation rate for that organism predicts that every single copy of the
HIV genome (for example) will have at least one mutation (10−4 rate).14
Unpredictable brain effects This has crucial effects in our brains that are completely
unpredictable because firstly of the randomness of the genetic mutations leading to these
specific microbes and viruses, and secondly of the details of the events that lead to their
spread through animal and human populations; this can all be expressed in terms of
rugged adaptive landscapes [Orr 2005]. This firstly directly affects human health and
brain dynamics in each of the set of interacting brains (§6.5) via the gut brain axis
[Cryan et al 2019], and then plays a key role in individual associated mental events such
as individual planning of what do to about anxiety, obesity, schizophrenia, Parkinson’s
disease, and Alzheimer’s disease, or flu, AIDS or COVID-19. This is a second reason the
external world has an important unpredictable key effect on individual brains.
6.5 Social understandings and individual brains
Our brain is a social brain (Section 3.4). Information from the external world affects
mental states via ongoing complex social interactions, which have real causal powers.
They structure our mental activities in everyday life.
Social understandings There is an intricate relation between the individual and soci-
ety [Berger 1963] [Longres 1990] [Berger and Luckmann 1991] [Donald 2001] and between
individuals and institutions in a society [Elder-Vass 2010] [Elder-Vass 2012]. The down-
ward effect of the social context on an individual brain is mediated by social interactions
and understandings (Section 3.4). In this social context, a complex interaction takes place
involving mind reading, prediction, filling in of missing data, taking social context into
account [Longres 1990] [Donald 2001] [Frith 2009]. This nature of the interactions of a
many brains, each a self causing open system (Section 5.5), is the main practical day to
day reason that microphysics everywhere cannot determine unique outcomes in each of
the brains involved. Downward causation from the social level interactions to individual
brains to the underlying molecular biology and thence physical levels is the causal chain.
Abstract variables have causal powers This is all enabled by our symbolic ability
[Deacon 1997], resulting in our use of spoken and written language, which is the key factor
enabling this to happen [Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019] (Section 3.5). This affects our
individual brain operations as we consider the continually changing detailed implications
of money, closed corporations, laws, passports, and so on in our lives.
Policy decisions have causal powers Given this context, social variables have causal
power [Longres 1990] [Harari 2014] and affect brain states; in particular, this applies to
policy decisions. The interaction outcomes are shaped at the social level, which is where
the real causal power resides, and then affect individual brain states in a downward way.
Complex interpretative processes take place shaping psychological level reactions, which
then shape neural network and synapse level changes in a contextual way on an ongoing
basis as studied by social neuroscience [Cacioppo et al 2002].
14I thank Ed Rybicki for this comment.
43
Unpredictable brain effects Policy decisions are sometimes based in unpredictable
events such as cyclones or forest fires (Section 6.3) or a global pandemic or local infectious
outbreak (Section 6.4). Mandatory evacuating of towns in the face of a cyclone or wild
fire,15 going into shelters in the case of a tornado, or policy decisions such as lockdowns
in the face of a pandemic will all be unpredictable because their cause is unpredictable,
and so will cause unpredictable outcomes in individual brains at macro and micro levels.
The causal chain is an unpredictable trigger event, followed by a social policy choice that
then changes outcomes in individual brains. Detailed physical data everywhere enables
this to happen by providing the basis for stochastic outcomes that cannot be determined
uniquely from that data be because of the real butterfly effect in the case of weather, and
its analogue in the case of microbe and viral mutations. Carlo’s view that microphysics
determines all brain dynamics in this extended context could hold if it were not for the
random nature of the trigger events.
6.6 Real Causal Closure
Carlo’s move of bringing into focus the larger context is certainly correct in the following
sense: the way that causal closure takes place in reality involves the whole environment.
But that means it is an interlevel affair, for the environment involves all scales.
The real nature of causal closure
• From my viewpoint, what is meant by the phrase “causal closure” as used by Carlo
and other physicists is in fact that one is talking about existence of a well-posed
effective theory EFL that holds at some emergent level L. This means data dL
for variables vL at that level L specifies unique outcomes, or the statistics of such
outcomes, at that level.
• However existence of such a theory does by itself not determine any specific physical
outcomes. It implies that if the right data and boundary conditions are present,
and all constraints that hold are specified, then a unique or statistical outcome is
predicted by the physics at that level.
• It does not attempt to say where that data, boundary conditions, and constraints
come from. But without them you do not have causal closure in what should be
taken to be the real meaning of the term: sufficient conditions are present to causally
determine real world outcomes that happen. For example social dynamics are active
causal factors that reach down to affect physics outcomes, as is abundantly clear in
the COVID-19 crisis: policies about face masks affect physical outcomes.
• My use of the term, as developed in full in [Ellis 2020b], regards causal closure as
interlevel affair, such as is vital to biological emergence [Mossio 2013]. The conjunc-
tion of upward and downward effects must self-consistently determine the boundary
conditions, constraints, and initial data at a sufficient set of levels that unique or
statistical outcomes are in fact determined by the interlocking whole.
• When that happens you can of course trace what is happening at whatever physics
level you choose as a base level L0. But over time, the later initial data, boundary
conditions, and constraints at that level are dynamically affected by the downward
mechanisms outlined in Section 2.5. Because causation is equally real at each level,
15For a typical context see https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/us/ca-fires.html.
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the higher levels are just as much key factors in the causal nexus as is level L0, as
time proceeds. Higher Level Organising Principles, independent of the lower level
physics, shape physical outcomes. The state of variables at level L0 at time t0
uniquely determines the higher levels at that time, but not at a later time t1 > t0.
• The freedom for higher levels to select preferred lower level outcomes exists because
of the stochastic nature of biological processes at the cellular level (Section 5.2).
• The illusion of the effective theory at a physical level L0 being causally complete is
because physicists neglect to take into account their own role in the experiments that
establish the validity of the effective theory that holds at that level. When you take
that role into account, those experiments involve causal closure of all levels from L0
to the psychological level L6 where experiments are planned and the social level L7
which enables the experimental apparatus to come into being.
Another term used for causal closure in this sense is operational closure: the organisational
form of the processes that enable autopoietic self-production and conservation of system
boundaries [Di Paolo and Thompson 2014] [Ramstead et al 2019].
The predictive coding/free energy viewpoint My view agrees with the growing
predictive coding consensus, as presented in previous sections. Karl Friston (private com-
munication) says the following:
“I imagine that downward causation is an integral part of the free energy for-
malism; particularly, its predication on Markov blankets. I say this in the
sense that I have grown up with a commitment to the circular causality im-
plicit in synergetics and the slaving principle (c.f., the Centre Manifold The-
orem in dynamical systems). As such, it would be difficult to articulate any
mechanics without the downward causation which completes the requisite cir-
cular causality. Practically, this becomes explicit when deriving a renormal-
isation group for Markov blankets. We use exactly the same formalism that
Herman Haken uses in his treatments of the slaving principle [Haken 1996]
[Haken and Wunderlin 1988] to show that Markov blankets of Markov blan-
kets constitute a renormalisation group. If existence entails a Markov blanket,
then downward causation (in the sense of the slaving principle) must be an
existential imperative.”
The final conclusion of this section is the following
Unique causal outcomes in individual microphysical brain states do
not occur when one includes causal effects of the external world.
This does not work (i) because microphysics is not in fact causally
closed due to quantum wave function collapse, (ii) external informa-
tion cannot uniquely determine microphysical states in the brain -
multiple realisability makes this impossible, (iii) unpredictable macro
level chaotic dynamics occurs, (iv) microbiome dynamics that affect
brain states is unpredictable, and (v) the way external states in-
fluence brain states is strongly socially determined and can include
events that are in principle unpredictable.
However it certainly is true that such downward causal effects on individual brains occur.
They just do not do so in a way that is uniquely determined by physical effects alone.
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7 Microphysics Enables but Does Not Determine
In this section I summarise my response (Section 7.1), and comment on the relation of all
the above to the issue of free will (Section 7.2) and to the possibility spaces that are the
deep structure of the cosmos (Section 7.3).
7.1 The basic response
There are a series of key issues that shape my response.
• I am concerned with what determines the specific outcomes that occur in real world
contexts, not just with statistical prediction of outcomes. How does physics underlie
the existence of a Ming dynasty teapot? Of the particular digital computer on
which I am typing this response? Of Einstein’s publication of his paper on General
Relativity? Of the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States of
America?
• Consider a specific individual brain at a particular time. The difference between
synchronic and diachronic emergence is key. Carlo’s view can be defended in the
synchronic emergence case, but cannot be correct in the diachronic case, because
individual brains are open systems. The initial microphysical state of the brain
simply does not include all the data that determine its outcomes at later times.
This is what is discussed in depth in Sections 3 - 5.
The whole universe context Claiming that this problem is solved by going to a larger
scale where causal closure does indeed hold (the cosmological scale), which therefore im-
plies that the specific evolution of all subsystems such as individual brains is also uniquely
determined, does not work for a series of reasons. I list them now with the theoretically
most important issues first. This is the inverse of the order that matters in terms of de-
termining outcomes in practical terms. As far as that is concerned, the most important
issues are the later ones.
It does not work because of,
1. Irreducible quantum uncertainty at the micro level which affects macro outcomes;
this demonstrates that the claim is wrong in principle. It can indeed have macro ef-
fects on the brain, but this is not so important at present times because of the shield-
ing effect of the earth’s atmosphere. However it has played important role in evolu-
tionary history [Percival 1991], as discussed by [Todd 1994] [Scalo and Wheeler 2002]
2. The fact that downward effects from that larger context to the brain, which certainly
occur via neural plasticity and learning, cannot in principle determine a unique brain
microstate, because of multiple realisability of those detailed physical states when
this occurs. Unique brain microstates cannot occur in this way.
3. Uncertainty in principle at the ecosystem level due to chaotic dynamics and the real
butterfly effect plus the inability to set initial molecular conditions precisely. This has
major unpredictable effects on individual brains due to forest fires, thunderstorms,
tornadoes, and tropical cyclones.
4. Microbiome dynamics that is in principle unpredictable because of the molecular
storm and huge number of molecules involved, plus the inability to set initial molec-
ular conditions precisely. This affects individual and social outcomes as evolution
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takes place on a rugged adaptive landscape that keeps changing as all the interacting
species evolve. This crucially affects brain dynamics through the gut-brain axis.
5. Social understandings that shape how external signals are interpreted by the brain,
when social level policies and choices (which may involve unpredictable events such
as thunderstorm details or pandemic outbreaks) chain down to influence flows of
electrons in axons. It simply is not a purely physics interaction.
Carlo’s vision of the external world as a whole evolving uniquely and thereby determining
unique brain states because they are a part of the whole, may work in some contexts where
irreducible uncertainty 1. and effective uncertainty 3. and 4. do not occur. It cannot
however work when any of these effects come into play, which certainly happens in the
real world. This demonstrates that as a matter of principle, it is the higher level effects -
psychological and social variables - that are sometimes calling the tune. But that means
they are always effectively doing so in the social context which is the habitat of minds.
Causal closure Real world causal closure is an interlevel affair, with microphysical
outcomes determined by features ranging from global warming and tropical cyclones to
COVID-19 policy decisions. It simply cannot occur at the microphysics level alone. Some
of the effective variables which have changed human history are abstract concepts such as
the invention of arithmetic, the concept of money, and the idea of a closed corporation.
These have all crucially affected microphysical outcomes, as have abstract theories such
as the theory of the laser and the concepts of algorithms, compilers, and the internet.
Overall, as stated by [Bishop 2012], the situation is that
“Whatever necessity the laws of physics carry, it is always conditioned by the
context into which the laws come to expression.”
So in response to Carlo’s final email (Section 1.1):
CR Today the burden of the proof is not on this side. Is on the opposite side. Because:
(i) There is no single phenomenon in the world where microphysics has been proven
wrong (in its domain of validity of velocity, energy, size...).
GE The view I put respects the microphysics completely. Of course it underlies all emer-
gent phenomena, without exception. Microphysics certainly is not wrong.
CR (ii) By induction and Occam’s razor, is a good assumption that in its domain validity
it holds.
GE Yes it holds in its domain of validity, which is at the microscale. The question at
stake is, How much larger is its domain of validity? I think the comment is meant
to say that its domain of validity includes biology and the brain, in the sense that,
by itself it fully determines all biological and brain outcomes.
However completely new kinds of behaviour emerge in the biological domain. The
kind of causation that emerges is simply different than the kind of statistically de-
terminist relation between data and outcomes that holds at the microphysical level.
The microphysics allows this emergence: it lies within the space of possibilities deter-
mined by that physics. In that sense the higher level outcomes lie within the domain
of validity of the microphysics. But the microphysics by itself does not determine the
macro level outcomes (see the listed points above). Occam’s razor does not work.
47
CR (iii) There are phenomena too complex to calculate explicitly with microphysics.
These provide no evidence against (ii), they only testify to our limited tools.
GE Carlo only considers efficient causation, because that is what physicists study. As
Aristotle pointed out [Bodnar 2018], that is only one of the four kinds of causation
that occur in the real world (Section 2.5). In the real world the other kinds of
causation play a key role in determining outcomes. All four are needed to determine
specific outcomes.
I accept the need to provide the burden of proof. I have done so in the preceding sections.
7.2 What about Free Will?
The implication of Carlo’s argument is that the causal power of microphysics prevents the
existence of free will. This touches on a vast and complex debate. My arguments above
deny that the underlying physics can disprove existence of free will in a meaningful sense.
But that does not dispose of the debate. Does neurobiology/neuroscience deny free will?
Incomplete reductionism: neurobiology Francis Crick gives a neuroscience based
reductionist argument regarding the brain in The astonishing hypothesis [Crick 1994]:
“You, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your
sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior
of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. ”
Now the interesting point is that this a denial of Carlo’s arguments. Crick is assuming that
the real level of causation is at the cellular and molecular biology levels: that is where the
action is, it is at that level that physical outcomes are determined. The implication is that
this is what determines what specific dynamical outcomes take place at the underlying
physical level - which is my position [Ellis and Kopel 2019].
Free will and neurobiology As to free will itself, does neurobiology and neuroscience
deny its existence? That is a long and fraught debate related to intentionality and agency.
Amongst the deeply considered books that argue for meaningful free will are [Donald 2001]
[Dupre´ 2001] [Murphy and Brown 2007] [Murphy et al 2009] [Baggini 2015]. [Frith 2013]
has a nuanced discussion on agency and free will. [Murphy and Brown 2007] conclude
(page 305) that “free will should be understood as being the primary cause of one’s own
actions; this is a holistic capacity of mature, self-reflective human organisms acting within
suitable social contexts”. This is essentially the consensus of the authors just named,
Libet’s experiments notwithstanding. Chris Frith 16 expresses it this way [Frith 2009]:
“ I suggest that the physiological basis of free will, the spontaneous and intrinsic
selection of one action rather than another, might be identified with mechanisms
of top-down control. Top-down control is needed when, rather than responding
to the most salient stimulus, we concentrate on the stimuli and actions relevant
to the task we have chosen to perform. Top-down control is particularly rele-
vant when we make our own decisions rather than following the instructions of
an experimenter. Cognitive neuroscientists have studied top-down control ex-
tensively and have demonstrated an important role for dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex and anterior cingulate cortex. If we consider the individual in isolation,
16One of the topmost cited neuroscientists in the world: he had 203,843 citations on 2020/08/01.
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then these regions are the likely location of will in the brain. However, indi-
viduals do not typically operate in isolation. The demonstration of will even
in the simplest laboratory task depends upon an implicit agreement between the
subject of the experiment and the experimenter. The top of top-down control
is not to be found in the individual brain, but in the culture that is the human
brain’s environmental niche”
This is a good description of both topdown effects in the brain [Ellis 2018] and interlevel
causal closure [Ellis 2020b]. It is also expressed well by [Baggini 2015].
Free will denialists don’t really believe it The physicist Anton Zeilinger told me
the following story. He was once being harassed by someone who strongly argued that we
do not have free will. Anton eventually in frustration reached out and slapped him in the
face. He indignantly shouted, “Why did you do that?”, to which Anton responded “Why
do you ask me that question? You have just been explaining to me at length that I am not
responsible for my actions. According to you, it’s not a legitimate question.”
If you have an academic theory about the nature of causation and free will, it must
apply in real life too, not just when you are engaged in academic argumentation. If not,
there is no reason whatever for anyone else to take it seriously - for you yourself do not.
Free will and the possibility of science The ultimate point is that if we don’t have
meaningful free will, in the sense of the possibility of making rational choices between
different possible understandings on the basis of coherence and evidence, then science
as an enterprise is impossible. You then cannot in a meaningful way be responsible for
assessing theories anyone proposes. The theory that free will does not exist causes the
demise of any process of scientific investigation that is alleged to lead to that theory. We
had better find a better theory - such as those in the books cited above.
Denial of consciousness or qualia Finally one should note that many pursuing the
view that free will does not exists also deny that consciousness and/or qualia exist and
play any role in brain function. But neuroscience simply does not know how to solve
the hard problem of consciousness [Chalmers 1995]. As stated in [Tallis 2016], neuro-
science helps define the necessary conditions for the existence of human consciousness
and behaviour, but not the sufficient conditions. The self-defeating philosophical move of
denying that consciousness and/or qualia exist (“what one canot explain does not exist”
[Tallis 2016]) does not succeed in explanatory terms: how can you deny something if you
have no consciousness? In that case, you do not satisfy the necessary conditions to deny
anything: you do not exist in any meaningful sense [Donald 2001]. For more on this see
also [Gabriel 2017] [Dennett and Strawson 2018].
But in any event this is a different debate than my debate with Carlo, which in the end is
about physics denying free will.
7.3 Possibility Spaces
All the biological effects discussed here are allowed by the underlying physical levels: they
do not violate or alter those generic equations, which apply to all physical interactions
without exception.
A useful way to characterise this is in terms of possibility spaces. In the case of physics,
these include phase spaces [Arnold 1989] (classical physics) and Hilbert spaces (quantum
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physics) [Isham 2001]. These are determined by the laws of physics, and are indeed equiv-
alent to them: the laws allow the possibilities described by the possibility spaces, and the
possibility spaces characterise the nature of the underlying laws.
Now the interesting point is that there are also biological possibility spaces. At the mi-
crobiology level they include a space of all possible proteins allowed by the laws of physics
[Wagner 2014], of which only some have been realised on Earth by evolutionary processes
[Petsko and Ringe 2009]. Similarly there are sets of possible genotype-phenotype maps for
metabolism and for gene regulation [Wagner 2014]. There are limitations on physiological
possibilities due to the nature of physics [Vogel 2000] and consequent scaling laws for bi-
ology [West et al 1997]. These are all immutable biological possibilities that, just like the
laws of physics, are the same everywhere in the universe at all times, and allow life as we
know it to come into existence in suitable habitats.
The claim one can make then is that Higher Level Organising principles such as those
that are identified in this paper for biology in general and for the brain in particular are also
of this nature: they are timeless and eternal principles that can be expected to apply to life
everywhere, because this is the only way it can work in principle. Thus these would include
the possibility of metabolic networks, genes and gene regulatory networks [Wagner 2014];
of physiological systems [Rhoades and Pflanzer 1989] [Hall 2016] and developmental pro-
cesses [Wolpert et al 2002]; of Evo-Devo type evolution [Carroll 2008]; and of social brains
[Dunbar 1998] operating on hierarchical predictive coding principles [Clark 2013], that are
capable of analytical thought based in a symbolic capacity [Deacon 1997].
These are all possible, as they do indeed exist, so the possibility of their existence is
written into the nature of things. This is allowed by the underlying physics, but they rep-
resent higher order principles allowing life to come into existence and flourish, as discussed
in depth by Stuart Kauffman inhos book At Home in the Universe [Kauffman 1995].
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